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The NESS Account of Natural Causation:  
A Response to Criticisms
RICHARD W WRIGHT*
I. InTroducTIon
The NESS (necessary element of a sufficient set) account of natural (scientific, ‘actual’, ‘fac-
tual’) causation is usually acknowledged to be a more satisfactory and comprehensive 
account than the traditional sine qua non (‘but for’) account.1 However, objections have 
been raised to the claim that the NESS account fully captures the concept of natural causa-
tion (hereafter ‘causation’) and properly handles all types of situations. Various types of 
counter-examples have been proposed. More fundamentally, it is argued that the NESS 
account is viciously circular, since causal terminology often is used in its elaboration and it 
relies upon the concept of causal laws.2
Many of the objections raised against the NESS account assume that it is essentially the 
same as Herbert Hart’s and Tony Honoré’s ‘causally relevant factor’ account and John 
Mackie’s INUS account. In section II of this chapter I distinguish these three accounts, 
which differ in important ways that make the latter two accounts vulnerable to objections 
to which the NESS account is immune, and I offer an account of causal laws that I believe 
* I am grateful to my critics for raising issues that forced me to develop further my elaborations of the NESS 
account, to Horacio Spector for helpful discussions during the early stages of preparation of this chapter, and to 
David Cheifetz and Tony Dillof for helpful comments during the final stage.
1 eg American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Third, Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm 
[Restatement Third] (St Paul, Minnesota, American Law Institute, 2010) s 26 comment c, s 27 comments a, f–i and 
reporters’ notes; A Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009) 417–21, 426; 
DA Fischer, ‘Insufficient Causes’ (2006) 94 University of Kentucky Law Review 277, 281–84, 317; R Fumerton and 
K Kress, ‘Causation and the Law: Preemption, Lawful Sufficiency, and Causal Sufficiency’ (2001) 64:4 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 83, 83–84, 95–97; T Honoré, ‘Necessary and Sufficient Conditions in Tort Law’ in 
DG Owen (ed), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990) 363, 363–64, 366, 
367, 374–77, 381–85; M Kelman, ‘The Necessary Myth of Objective Causation Judgments in Liberal Political 
Theory’ (1987) 63 Chicago-Kent Law Review 579, 601–03; W Lucy, Philosophy of Private Law (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2007) 170–76; MS Moore, Causation and Responsibility (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009) 
473–74, 486–90, 493; SR Perry, ‘The Impossibility of General Strict Liability’ (1988) 1 Canadian Journal of Law 
and Jurisprudence 147, 157; J Stapleton, ‘Choosing What We Mean by “Causation” in the Law’ (2008) 73 Missouri 
Law Review 433, 443–44, 471–72, 474; JJ Thomson, ‘Some Reflections on Hart and Honoré, Causation in the Law’ 
in M Kramer et al (eds), The Legacy of HLA Hart: Legal, Political and Moral Philosophy (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2008) 143, 144, 148–50, 157, 163–64.
2 Beever (n 1) 422–25; Fischer (n 1); Fumerton and Kress (n 1) 84, 97–104; Kelman (n 1) 603–08; Moore (n 1) 
477, 484, 494–95; Stapleton (n 1) 472–79; Thomson (n 1) 147–54.
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rebuts the claim that the NESS account is viciously circular. In section III I argue that the 
NESS account handles properly the various types of situations that have been raised as 
alleged counter-examples to its comprehensive validity. In both parts, the most significant 
criticisms are addressed in the text, while other criticisms are discussed in the footnotes.
II. dIsTInguIshIng The ness AccounT from hArT And  
honoré’s And mAckIe’s AccounTs
The NESS account often is erroneously equated with Hart and Honoré’s account of a ‘caus-
ally relevant factor’ and John Mackie’s account of an INUS condition. This is understand-
able, since, although I have often noted the significant differences between the NESS 
account and the other two accounts, I drew on both of the other accounts in developing 
and elaborating the NESS account, credited Hart and Honoré with the initial elaboration 
of the weak sense of necessity that underlies each of the three accounts and distinguishes 
them from the traditional sine qua non account, and loosely used the NESS acronym to 
refer to Hart and Honoré’s account as well as my own account.3 However, the criticisms 
directed indiscriminately against all three accounts do not apply to the NESS account, 
owing to the significant differences between it and the other two accounts.
The weak sense of necessity that underlies all three accounts was initially elaborated in 
1959 in Hart and Honoré’s seminal treatise, Causation in the Law.4 Contrary to the tradi-
tional insistence in law, and by many philosophers, that a cause be a condition that ‘made a 
difference’ by being strongly necessary for the occurrence of the consequence, in the sense 
that without it the consequence would not have occurred on the particular occasion, Hart 
and Honoré employed John Stuart Mill’s scientific-method based account of causal laws 
and singular instances of causation5 to explain that a ‘causally relevant factor’ need merely 
be ‘necessary just in the sense that it is one of the set of conditions jointly sufficient for the 
production of the consequence: it is necessary because it is required to complete this set’.6 
Under this weak sense of necessity, which is also referred to as strong sufficiency, necessity 
is subordinated to sufficiency: a causally relevant factor need merely be necessary for the 
sufficiency of a set of conditions sufficient for the occurrence of the consequence, rather 
than being necessary for the consequence itself as in the sine qua non account.7
Hart and Honoré demonstrated the superiority of their weak-necessity account of a 
causally relevant factor to the sine qua non account in a variety of situations.8 They also cor-
rectly emphasised that causation is an empirical rather than a merely analytical, logical or 
identity relation.9 However, their account had some significant deficiencies, all of which are 
3 RW Wright, ‘Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble 
Bush by Clarifying the Concepts’ (1988) 73 Iowa Law Review 1001, 1018–34.
4 HLA Hart and AM Honoré, Causation in the Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1959).
5 HLA Hart and T Honoré, Causation in the Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985) 13–22, 
111–13; see JS Mill, A System of Logic bk III ch IV s 1, ch V ss 2–3, ch VIII ss 1–4, ch X ss 1–3; RW Wright, 
‘Causation in Tort Law’ (1985) 73 California Law Review 1735, 1788–91.
6 Hart and Honoré (n 5) 112.
7 See Wright (n 3) 1020–21 for discussion of the different senses of necessity and sufficiency.
8 Hart and Honoré (n 5) 122–28, 206–07, 235–53.
9 ibid 114–15; see Fumerton and Kress (n 1) 90–93; Thomson (n 1) 148 fn 7. Also to be ruled out are 
mere mereological relations – the relation between some entity and its constituent parts. See J Collins, N Hall and 
LA Paul, ‘Counterfactuals and Causation: History, Problems, and Prospects’ [Collins, Hall and Paul, Introduction] in 
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remedied in the NESS account. They apparently required that a causally relevant factor be 
either strongly necessary or independently strongly sufficient (sufficient for the occurrence 
of the consequence disregarding competing or duplicative conditions, but combined with 
the other weakly necessary conditions).10 This requirement results in erroneous denials of 
causal contribution in the frequently occurring situations in which numerous conditions 
combine to cause the consequence, but none of them individually were (or could be proven 
to be) strongly necessary or independently strongly sufficient.11 Hart and Honoré also sub-
merged and sometimes confused the critical distinction between duplicative and pre- 
emptive causation by constructing an overlapping typology of overdetermined causation 
cases,12 often emphasised ‘making a difference’ rather than sufficiency and thus sometimes 
erroneously employed strong-necessity rather than weak-necessity analysis in overdeter-
mined causation situations,13 interpreted the analysis of necessity as a hypothetical coun-
terfactual analysis rather than a real world factual analysis,14 interpreted sufficiency in terms 
J Collins, N Hall and LA Paul (eds), Causation and Counterfactuals (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1994) 1, 21–22, 44. 
Causation is an empirical relationship between concrete properties of distinct events or states of affairs. 
TL Beauchamp and A Rosenberg, Hume and the Problem of Causation (New York, Oxford University Press, 1981) 
251–52, 255–56, 281–82; JL Mackie, The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1974) 32–33, 256–58, 260–63, 266–67; R Fumerton, ‘Moore, Causation, Counterfactuals, and Responsibility’ (2003) 
40 San Diego Law Review 1273, 1278; LA Paul, ‘Aspect Causation’ in Collins, Hall and Paul (n 9) 205; Wright (n 3) 
1033–34 and fn 171. After long arguing otherwise, Moore now acknowledges this. Moore (n 1) 361–65, 368 fn 61. Yet 
he persists in wanting to refer to whole events, rather than their causally relevant instantiated properties, as causes. 
ibid 366–68, 395–96. He apparently is driven to this position by his rejection of the ‘harm within the risk’ (HWR) 
limitation on attributable responsibility and his erroneous belief that the law’s tortious-aspect-causation require-
ment is functionally equivalent to that limitation, which erroneous belief further leads him to claim that I support 
the HWR limitation. See ibid 104, 166–67 and fn 50. Contrary to Moore’s claims, ibid 329–31, the law is not ambiva-
lent between event-causation and aspect-causation, but rather clearly requires the latter, as I have shown while distin-
guishing, criticising and rejecting the HWR limitation. See Wright (n 5) 1759–74; RW Wright, ‘The Grounds and 
Extent of Legal Responsibility’ [Legal Responsibility] (2003) 40 San Diego Law Review 1425, 1479–1528.
10 Hart and Honoré (n 5) 123–25, 206–07, 235–39, 245, 249. Hart and Honoré did not discuss situations involv-
ing conditions that were neither strongly necessary nor independently strongly sufficient. Writing separately, 
Honoré noted, without elaboration, that such conditions could be causes. AM Honoré, ‘Causation and Remoteness 
of Damage’ in A Tunc (ed), International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol 11: Torts pt 1 (Tübingen, JCB 
Mohr, 1983) 7-107, 7-108, 7-115, 7-121. He apparently accepts the NESS account’s extension of the weak-necessity 
analysis to encompass such situations. See text to n 147 below.
11 See section III.E below.
12 Hart and Honoré (n 5) xl, 122–25, 206–07, 235–53; see Honoré (n 10) 7-126 to 7-140; Wright (n 5) 1796–97.
13 Hart and Honoré (n 5) 29, 34–37, 239–41, 246–48, 250–51; Honoré (n 1) 368–69, 371–73, 379–80; Honoré 
(n 10) 7-109 to 7-111(1), 7-126; see Thomson (n 1) 156–57; Wright (n 5) 1797–1801. As Hart and Honoré gener-
ally understood, ‘making a difference’ should be understood in the sense of weak necessity rather than strong 
necessity. See M Strevens, ‘Mackie Remixed’ in J Keim, M O’Rourke and D Shier (eds), Causation and Explanation 
(Cambridge, MIT Press, 2007) 93, 97–98, 111–12; RW Wright, ‘Acts and Omissions as Positive and Negative 
Causes’ in JW Neyers et al (eds), Emerging Issues in Tort Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007) 287, 294 fn 20.
14 Hart and Honoré (n 5) lviii–lxi; Honoré (n 1) 370–72. But see Honoré (n 1) 376–79 (engaging in causal suf-
ficiency analysis by matching actual concrete conditions against the abstract conditions in the antecedent of a 
causal law). For discussion of the many defects of the counterfactual-dependency analysis of causation, see Moore 
(n 1) 382–90, 392–425; Collins, Hall and Paul, Introduction (n 9) 2–12, 15–29; N Hall, ‘Two Concepts of Causation’ 
in Collins, Hall and Paul (n 9) 225, 225–26, 232–48; J Schaffer, ‘Trumping Preemption’ in Collins, Hall and Paul 
(n 9) 59, 67–71. Although I initially referred to the analysis of necessity in both the NESS account and the sine qua 
non account as a counterfactual analysis, see Wright (n 5) 1803–07, I have always insisted that the analysis is (or 
should be) a real-world ‘covering law’ matching of actual conditions against the required elements of the relevant 
causal generalisations rather than a counterfactual ‘possible worlds’ exploration of what might have occurred in 
the absence of the condition at issue. ibid; Wright (n 13) 296–97; Wright, Legal Responsibility (n 9) 1444–45 and 
fn 67; RW Wright, ‘Once More Into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal Contribution, and the Extent of Legal 
Responsibility’ [Once More] (2001) 54 Vanderbilt Law Review 1071, 1106–07; Wright (n 3) 1035–37, 1039–42; see 
n 119 and text to nn 118–19 below. The existence of these two very different methods of analysing necessity is 
noted by Moore, who however incorrectly describes both methods as ‘counterfactual’ and focuses on the second 
approach. Moore (n 1) 372–82, 390.
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of abstract, incomplete causal generalisations rather than complete instantiation of the 
causal laws underlying the causal generalisations,15 and denied that human decisions and 
actions are governed by causal laws.16
Nevertheless, Hart and Honoré’s account of a causally relevant factor was a major 
advance in the analysis of causation in both law and philosophy. Unfortunately, however, 
their account was overshadowed and distorted by their primary emphasis on elaborating 
supposedly factual ‘common sense’ principles for treating only some causally relevant 
factors as causes,17 so that, initially, it received minimal attention in the legal literature.18
Hart and Honoré’s account had a significant impact on non-legal philosophers, a num-
ber of whom subsequently published analyses of causation similar to Hart and Honoré’s 
account, although generally without citing Hart and Honoré. The best known analysis 
was published in 1965 by a fellow professor at Oxford, John Mackie, who employed an 
acronym, INUS (for ‘insufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condi-
tion’), to facilitate reference to his analysis.19 However, these philosophers only used the 
weak-necessity analysis to describe causal laws. For singular instances of causation they 
required that the condition at issue be necessary for the occurrence of the consequence in 
the particular circumstances, thereby converting their accounts into the sine qua non 
account.20 Mackie went further: he denied that identification of singular instances of causa-
tion requires any (even implicit) reference to causal laws or generalisations.21 Mackie’s 
arguments on these two issues do not withstand analysis and are contradicted by other 
arguments that he himself makes.22 Yet, due perhaps to the handy INUS acronym, philoso-
phers have generally referred to Mackie’s INUS account of weak necessity rather than Hart 
and Honoré’s earlier account.23
In 1985, I substantially revised and extended Hart and Honoré’s account of a causally 
relevant factor and created the NESS acronym to refer to this revised and extended 
account.24 According to the NESS account as initially elaborated, a condition c was a cause 
15 Hart and Honoré (n 5) 15, 22, 32, 44–45, 111–12, 124–25, 207, 237; Honoré (n 10) 7-53.
16 See section III.F below.
17 See RW Wright, ‘The Nightmare and the Noble Dream: Hart and Honoré on Causation and Responsibility’ 
in M Kramer et al (eds), The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart: Legal, Political and Moral Philosophy (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2008) 165. The introduction to Causation in the Law focuses entirely on this issue; it does not 
mention the distinction between natural causation and attributions of responsibility or their account of causally 
relevant factors. See Hart and Honoré (n 5) 1–7; cf ibid 8–12.
18 See Wright (n 5) 1788 fn 227.
19 JL Mackie, ‘Causes and Conditions’ in E Sosa and M Tooley (eds), Causation (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1993) 33, 34–37, originally published in (1965) 2 American Philosophical Quarterly 245 and revised and 
reprinted as chapter three of Mackie (n 9). Honoré states that Mackie ‘applied our idea’ in developing his INUS 
account. Honoré (n 1) 365. However, unlike Hart and Honoré’s account or the NESS account, Mackie literally 
requires that an INUS condition be insufficient by itself for the consequence and that the sufficient condition of 
which it is a part be unnecessary. Both restrictions are too strict.
20 eg Mackie (n 9) 38–48, 62, 76–77, 126–27; see Wright (n 3) 1023 fn 113.
21 Mackie (n 9) 40–58, 76–78, 120–22. Fumerton, Kress and Moore seem to agree with Mackie. See Fumerton 
and Kress (n 1) 97. Despite Moore’s insistence that singular instances of causation must always be ‘accompanied 
by’ causal laws, Moore (n 1) 361–64, 472, 496–97, 506, and his declaration that the notion that one can directly 
observe singular causal relations is a ‘hogchoker of a premise’, ibid 363, he asserts that singular causal relations are 
basic and prior to causal laws, which are mere inductively derived generalisations from already identified (in some 
unexplained manner) true singular instances of causation. ibid 361, 472–73, 497–99, 506. In the end Moore seems 
to abandon even this apparently superfluous role for causal laws and instead to opt for being a ‘reluctant primitiv-
ist’. See ibid xii, 505–12.
22 See Hart and Honoré (n 5) xxxix–xlii; Wright (n 3) 1023–34; text to nn 42–64, 156–59 below.
23 See Wright (n 3) 1023 fn 113.
24 Wright (n 5) 1788–1803.
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of a consequence e if and only if it was necessary for the sufficiency of a set of existing 
antecedent conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of e.25 The required sense 
of sufficiency, which (following a suggestion by Fumerton and Kress)26 I call ‘causal 
sufficiency’ to distinguish it from mere lawful strong sufficiency, is the instantiation of all 
the conditions in the antecedent (‘if ’ part) of a causal law, the consequent (‘then’ part) of 
which is instantiated by the consequence at issue.27 A causal law is an empirically derived 
statement that describes a successional relation between a set of abstract conditions 
(properties or features of possible events and states of affairs in our real world) that consti-
tute the antecedent and one or more specified conditions of a distinct28 abstract event or 
state of affairs that constitute the consequent such that, regardless of the state of any other 
conditions, the instantiation of all the conditions in the antecedent entails the immediate 
instantiation of the consequent, which would not be entailed if less than all of the condi-
tions in the antecedent were instantiated.
It is critically important when analysing singular instances of causation to distinguish 
causal relations from mere lawful relations. To do so one must include in the causal analysis 
the entire causal process up to the time of the occurrence of the consequence.29 The defini-
tion of a causal law in the immediately preceding paragraph assures this by requiring that 
the instantiation of the consequent of the causal law occur immediately when all of the 
conditions in the antecedent of the causal law have been instantiated. A causal process con-
sists of the instantiation of one or more simultaneously or successively operative causal 
laws. Another critical feature of causal laws – and the related concept of causal sufficiency 
as distinct from mere lawful sufficiency – is their successional or directional nature, accord-
ing to which the instantiation of the conditions in the antecedent of the causal law causes 
the instantiation of the consequent, but not vice versa.30 Our knowledge of the required 
conditions in the antecedent of a causal law – and thus of the direction of causation – is 
based on experience and empirical investigation, by ourselves or others. Scientists employ 
Mill’s Difference Method in carefully designed experiments to see if the non-instantiation 
of a supposed antecedent condition makes a difference in the occurrence of the conse-
quence.31 For example, we determine by observation or experimentation that eliminating a 
flagpole or changing its height eliminates or changes the length of the flagpole’s shadow, 
but not vice versa.32 In the causal law that is thereby derived, the successionally antecedent 
NESS conditions are grouped together in the ‘if ’ part of the causal law and the consequent 
is stated separately in the ‘then’ part. The successional nature of causation is incorporated 
25 See text to n 40 below for my current definition of a concrete NESS condition. The definition in the text here 
is itself a clarification of my initial definition, which literally merely required that a NESS condition be a necessary 
member of a sufficient set and thus failed to expressly incorporate the requirement, which has always been stated 
in my elaborations of the NESS account, that a NESS condition be necessary for the sufficiency of a sufficient set. 
eg Wright (n 5) 1790; Wright (n 3) 1019, 1021, 1041. Richard Fumerton and Ken Kress drew my attention to the 
ambiguity in my initial definition. See Fumerton and Kress (n 1) 94; Wright, Once More (n 14) 1103 fn 112.
26 Fumerton and Kress (n 1) 93, 101–02; see Wright, Once More (n 14) 1103 fn 113. Michael Strevens employs 
the term ‘causal sufficiency’ for a similar, if not identical, concept of sufficiency. See text to n 73 below.
27 I have always insisted on this. eg Wright (n 5) 1789, 1795–98, 1803–04, 1808–09, 1823; Wright (n 3) 1031, 
1033, 1041–42, 1045–46, 1049–53.
28 See n 9 above.
29 See Fumerton and Kress (n 1) 103–04; Hall (n 14) 238–40; Honoré (n 10) 7-53, 7-107, 7-110; Schaffer (n 14) 
67–71; Strevens (n 13) 113–16; Thomson (n 1) 153–54, 164; text to n 73 below.
30 Fumerton and Kress (n 1) 93; see sections III.B and III.C below.
31 See Mill (n 5) bk III ch VII ss 2–4, ch VIII s 2.
32 However, as Hart and Honoré note, one should be careful not to treat human manipulability as a require-
ment for being a cause. Hart and Honoré (n 5) 36.
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in the concept of causal sufficiency, which is defined as the complete instantiation of all the 
conditions in the antecedent of the relevant causal law.33
While the NESS account’s definition of causal sufficiency relies upon the concept of a 
causal law, the concept of a causal law is defined above without any use of causal language. 
There is no conceptual circularity here, vicious or otherwise. Even if some circularity 
should be found to exist in these definitions, it would not be ‘vicious’. The NESS account 
provides a description of the structure of causal laws and their instantiation that is acknow-
ledged, even by its critics, to be illuminating and very useful for proper identification of 
singular instances of causation.34
Our knowledge of causal laws generally is incomplete, and even when it is complete we 
rarely refer to completely specified causal laws, since such complete specification would be 
extremely burdensome and unnecessarily detailed and lengthy. We rather employ causal 
generalisations, which refer to only some of the antecedent conditions in the relevant causal 
laws and have only as much specificity as is possible and needed in the particular situation. 
For example, we usually refer to the causal generalisation that specifies that bringing a 
flame into contact with combustible material causes that material to burn, without 
referring to other necessary antecedent conditions such as the presence of oxygen or the 
absence of a soaking rain – unless the latter expected conditions did not exist in the par-
ticular situation or, conversely, existed but were not expected. Moreover, the generalisations 
that we employ usually refer elliptically to a large number of simultaneously or successively 
operative causal laws.35
However, when we make an assertion regarding a singular instance of causation, we are 
implicitly asserting that all the unstated as well as the stated conditions in the relevant 
causal generalisations and all the unknown as well as known conditions in the causal laws 
underlying the causal generalisations were instantiated on the particular occasion. Contrary 
to Hart and Honoré’s account,36 the NESS account insists that singular instances of causa-
tion always consist of the complete instantiation on a particular occasion of one or more 
causal laws, and that identification of a singular instance of causation always implies that 
such complete instantiation has occurred.37 The implication may be based on direct par-
ticularistic evidence of the existence of one or more of the required conditions, or, as is 
always true for the unknown conditions in the causal laws and generally true for many 
(sometimes all) of the known conditions, is inferred from particularistic evidence of the 
network of causal relationships that encompasses the particular occasion.38
33 See text to n 27 above. Interpreted in the usual manner, causal succession precludes temporally backward 
causation, through which events today change events in the past. However, the definition of causal succession in 
the text does not preclude such backward causation, which would occur if the present instantiation of the ante-
cedent results in the immediately following instantiation of the consequent (paradoxically) in the past.
34 eg Beever (n 1) 426; Fischer (n 1) 277, 281–84, 302, 317; Fumerton and Kress (n 1) 83–84, 95–97, 102–04; 
Moore (n 1) 361–62, 368 and fns 59 and 61, 473–74, 486–90, 493; Stapleton (n 1) 443–44, 471–72, 474; Thomson 
(n 1) 144, 148–50, 163–64.
35 Hart and Honoré (n 5) xxxvii, 11–13, 31–32, 45–49; Honoré (n 10) 7-53; Mackie (n 9) 35–38, 66–76; Mill 
(n 5) bk III ch IV s 1, ch V ss 2–3; Moore (n 1) 477–78, 485; Strevens (n 13) 111–12; Wright (n 5) 1823–24; Wright 
(n 3) 1031–34, 1045–46. Hart and Honoré erroneously claim that Mill insisted that all of the conditions in the 
antecedent of the relevant causal law must be known before selecting only one or a few for explicit reference in a 
singular causal statement. Hart and Honoré (n 5) 15, 21, 22, 31, 44–47; Honoré (n 10) 7-53.
36 See text to n 15 above. But see Honoré (n 1) 367, 376, 385 (apparently accepting the NESS account’s concep-
tion of causal generalisations and singular instances of causation).
37 See text to nn 25–27 above.
38 Wright (n 3) 1045–46, 1049–52.
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Even when the inference of an applicable causal generalisation (and the underlying 
causal laws) is based on a single observation of a singular instance of causation, the infer-
ence of causation in the singular instance comes after and depends upon the inference of 
the applicable causal generalisation. In such instances the order is (1) observation of 
the occurrence, (2) inference of the causal generalisation based on the observation, and 
(3) assertion of causation through enunciation of the singular causal statement, which 
implicitly invokes the causal generalisation.39
My initial elaborations of the NESS account were overly demanding. I incorporated the 
weak-necessity requirement in the definition of singular instances of causation. As I have 
previously stated, this is too restrictive. The weak-necessity requirement is sufficiently 
incorporated in a properly formulated causal law, which contains in its antecedent only 
those abstract conditions the instantiation of which is necessary for the sufficiency of the 
set of conditions that is sufficient for the immediate instantiation of its consequent. When 
analysing singular instances of causation, an actual condition c was a cause of an actual 
condition e if and only if c was a part of (rather then being necessary for) the instantiation 
of one of the abstract conditions in the completely instantiated antecedent of a causal law, 
the consequent of which was instantiated by e immediately after the complete instantiation 
of its antecedent, or (as is more often the case) if c is connected to e through a sequence of 
such instantiations of causal laws.40 This formulation of the requirement for a NESS condi-
tion is more straightforward and simpler to apply than my initial formulation, which 
requires ‘at least so much’ descriptions of actual conditions in some situations in order to 
(validly) treat other conditions as NESS conditions.41 However, care must be taken to make 
sure that the antecedents of the relevant causal laws include only abstract NESS conditions 
in the strict sense – that is, those abstract conditions the instantiation of which is necessary 
for the sufficiency of the set of conditions that is sufficient for the instantiation of the con-
sequent.
The sine qua non account’s strong-necessity analysis, properly applied,42 is a corollary of 
the NESS analysis that gives the correct answer when there was only one set of conditions 
that was actually or potentially sufficient for the consequence on the particular occasion.43 
Contrary to what many assume,44 the sine qua non analysis relies on an embedded analysis 
of (lawful rather than causal) sufficiency. To determine if some condition was strongly 
necessary for the occurrence of some consequence that actually occurred, one must ‘rope 
off ’ the condition at issue and then, using the relevant causal generalisations, determine 
whether the remaining existing conditions were lawfully sufficient for the occurrence of the 
consequence – that is, whether the relevant causal laws would have been fully instantiated 
39 ibid 1031–34; see Mill (n 5) bk III ch III.
40 Wright (n 13) 297–98; Wright (n 3) 1045; see text to nn 27–29 above. Allan Beever fails to note my recent 
confinement of the weak-necessity requirement to the abstract conditions in causal laws. He rejects any necessity 
restriction in causal analysis and instead merely requires that a condition be a member of a sufficient set. This 
‘weak sufficiency’ analysis opens the door to treating every condition as a cause. See Beever (n 1) 425–26; Wright 
(n 3) 1020–21.
41 Wright (n 5) 1793–94; Wright, Legal Responsibility (n 9) 1444–45; Wright, Once More (n 14) 1106–07; 
Wright (n 3) 1035–37; see text to nn 117–20 below.
42 See n 14 above.
43 Hart and Honoré (n 5) 112–13; Wright (n 3) 1021.
44 eg DW Robertson, ‘Causation in the Restatement Third of Torts: Three Arguable Mistakes’ (2009) 44 Wake 
Forest Law Review 1007, 1010 (‘[W]hen we make causation-attribution decisions, necessity vel non is the heart of 
the inquiry. . . . In torts cases, the cause-in-fact inquiry is always an attribution question, never a predictive one, so 
sufficiency issues are not in play’.).
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in the absence of the condition at issue. If they would have been, the condition at issue was 
not strongly necessary for the occurrence of the consequence.45
In overdetermined causation situations,46 in which there were two or more (usually 
overlapping) sets of conditions that were each actually or potentially sufficient – for exam-
ple, two fires each sufficient to destroy a house if the fire reaches the house while it is still 
standing, which merge and destroy the house (duplicative causation), or one of which 
reaches the house and destroys it before the other arrives (pre-emptive causation) – the 
NESS analysis reaches the proper conclusions regarding causation, while the sine qua non 
(‘but for’, ‘made a difference’) analysis as usually described and applied does not.47
The sine qua non analysis is able to reach the proper conclusion in many overdetermined 
causation situations if the consequence is qualified by the time at which it occurred,48 and 
in a few more such situations if it is further qualified by the location at which it occurred.49 
However, employing such qualifications will greatly expand the proliferation of causes, 
especially if trivial differences in the time or location of a specific event – for example, due 
to gravitational forces exerted by nearby objects – are taken into account, rather than dif-
ferences in the time or location of distinct events.50 More significantly, in many situations it 
will be impossible to determine whether the condition at issue had any effect on the timing 
or location of the consequence, and a condition can be a cause even if it had no effect on 
the timing or location, or not be a cause even though (if not pre-empted) it would have 
caused the consequence at the same time and location.51 The NESS analysis will properly 
resolve the causal issue in such situations; the sine qua non analysis will not.52
Some, including Hart and Honoré, Mackie, Michael Moore, Jane Stapleton and Robert 
Stevens, have stated that the sine qua non analysis can be further sharpened to reach the 
proper conclusion in overdetermined causation situations by specifying minute details of 
the consequence or qualifying it by the manner of its occurrence, ‘as and how it came 
45 Wright (n 13) 296–97; see D Lewis, ‘Void and Object’ in Collins, Hall and Paul (n 9) 277, 279, 288–89; n 119 
and text to nn 118–19 below.
46 Contrary to the usual practice, Stapleton and Michael Strevens apply the term ‘overdetermination’ only to 
duplicative causation situations. Stapleton (n 1) 442 fn 19; Strevens (n 13) 104–05.
47 Wright (n 5) 1775–76, 1791–98; Wright (n 3) 1018–28.
48 Wright, Once More (n 14) 1112–14; Wright (n 13) 292 fn 14. Stapleton ignores these sources and my unsuc-
cessful attempts to have the American Law Institute add a time-of-occurrence qualifier to the sine qua non test in 
s. 26 of the Restatement Third of Torts when she implies that I do not recognise that the sine qua non account can 
be modified in this manner to resolve the causal issue in many cases. See Stapleton (n 1) 452 and fn 42; American 
Law Institute, 79th Annual Meeting, Proceedings 2002 (Philadelphia, American Law Institute, 2003) 273–76; 
American Law Institute, 82nd Annual Meeting, Proceedings 2005 (Philadelphia, American Law Institute, 2006) 
81–84. The major defects in the Restatement Third’s treatment of ‘factual causation’ are discussed in n 125 below.
49 F Stella, ‘The Vitality of the Covering Law Model: Considerations on Wright and Mackie’ http://works.
bepress.com/richard_wright/34/ at 34–37.
50 Collins, Hall and Paul, Introduction (n 9) 46; Hall (n 14) 237, 239; Moore (n 1) 477–78; see text to nn 53–56 
below.
51 Collins, Hall and Paul, Introduction (n 9) 23–24; Hall (n 14) 235–38; Schaffer (n 14) 70–71; Wright, Once 
More (n 14) 1112–14.
52 Wright, Once More (n 14) 1112–14; see text to nn 83–88 and 96 below; cf Stapleton (n 1) 452–53 and fn 45 
(employing the NESS account’s causal sufficiency analysis rather than her ‘duplicate necessity’ analysis of ‘involve-
ment’, which is described in n 125 below, to avoid treating a pre-empted condition as a cause). Federico Stella 
acknowledged the need to turn to the NESS account to handle these types of situations. Stella (n 49) 38. Yet he 
otherwise preferred the time-and-location-qualified sine qua non account, in part because he erroneously assumed 
that the NESS analysis as applied in the law is not framed by a focus on the legally relevant conditions, ibid 23, 39, 
but primarily (I believe) because he was concerned that ‘in Italy to abandon [the sine qua non test] would lead to 
real disasters. Our judges . . . are very far from having a sound culture of proofs’. Federico Stella, email to Richard 
Wright, 25 January 2005.
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about’.53 Both approaches are defective and extremely promiscuous.54 The first approach 
will merely establish causation of some irrelevant detail of the consequence, rather than the 
consequence itself.55 This objection applies as well to minute differences in the time or loca-
tion of a specific event.56 The second approach is viciously circular,57 as Honoré and Moore 
now acknowledge.58 Although Honoré notes that the law requires that a plaintiff identify 
the specific event for which she seeks redress, including the time, place and persons 
involved, he now rejects, as part of the causal analysis, qualifying the consequence by time, 
location or manner of occurrence.59 Instead, he relies upon the NESS account’s causal suf-
ficiency analysis.60 It therefore is puzzling that he states, without elaboration, that the sine 
qua non account will ‘point to the same causal conclusion’ as the NESS account when ‘the 
[competing] causal processes are different’ or ‘one culminates in harm before the other’.61
Even initially, although stating that ‘[s]uch solutions are perfectly sound logically and 
legally’, Hart and Honoré correctly noted that the second approach requires ‘first deploying 
the more fundamental notion of sufficient conditions and so identifying the causal process 
which culminated in the harm’.62 Similarly, Mackie notes that this approach relies upon 
determining which of the competing causal stories was completed in the particular situa-
tion.63 Although Mackie does not acknowledge it, this is a causal sufficiency analysis rather 
than a strong necessity analysis. When even detailing the manner of occurrence will not 
distinguish the competing conditions using the sine qua non analysis, Mackie paradoxically 
asserts that none of the conditions individually were causes but all of them in the aggregate 
were.64
53 A Becht and F Miller, The Test of Factual Causation in Negligence and Strict Liability Cases (St. Louis, 
Washington University Press, 1961) 15–19; D Coady, ‘Preemptive Preemption’ in Collins, Hall and Paul (n 9) 325, 
327–33; Hart and Honoré (n 4) 118; Hart and Honoré (n 5) xli–xlii; Honoré (n 10) 7-111(2), 7-126; Mackie (n 9) 
45–46; NJ McBride and R Bagshaw, Tort Law, 3rd edn (Harlow, Pearson Education Ltd, 2008) 535 fn 16; M Moore, 
‘Thomson’s Preliminaries About Causation and Rights’ (1987) 63 Chicago-Kent Law Review 497, 510–11; 
R Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 131, 133–34 and n 12, 135; Stapleton (n 1) 442 
fn 19 (‘death by two bullets’), 452 (‘death by electrocution’, ‘death by explosion’). For hair-splitting semantic vari-
ations on this approach, see D Lewis, ‘Causation as Influence’ in Collins, Hall and Paul (n 9) 75, 85–90.
54 Collins, Hall and Paul, Introduction (n 9) 46; Hall (n 14) 237–38, 239; Strevens (n 13) 96–97, 98–99, 111–12.
55 Fumerton and Kress (n 1) 96-97; Wright (n 5) 1778–80.
56 See text to n 50 above.
57 Wright (n 5) 1777–78; Wright (n 3) 1025.
58 Honoré (n 1) 378–79; Moore (n 1) 87 fn 16.
59 Honoré (n 1) 378–79; see ibid 368.
60 See ibid 377–79.
61 ibid 374.
62 Hart and Honoré (n 4) 118; see ibid 119; cf Hart and Honoré (n 5) xli–xlii, 124–25 (no longer asserting that 
this approach is ‘sound logically and legally’). Although apparently not recognising what he is doing, Robert 
Stevens, in his attempt to defend the ‘but for’ test as the sole test of causation, employs causal sufficiency analysis 
rather than ‘but for’ analysis to reach the proper conclusion in several much-discussed overdetermined causation 
situations. He also resurrects the discredited privity of contract limitation on tort liability in order to explain the 
mechanic’s lack of liability in the unused defective brakes case. See Stevens (n 53) 135–37; text to nn 83–94, 116–
23 and 179–95 below.
63 Mackie (n 9) 45–46.
64 ibid 47, criticised in Moore (n 1) 354–56; Wright (n 3) 1026–27. Stevens claims to reject Mackie’s aggregative 
move, not because it is illogical but rather because the law focuses on individual rather than aggregative responsi-
bility. Stevens (n 53) 131. However, he implicitly employs it when assessing ‘substitutive’ and consequential dam-
ages for infringement of a right. For example, if a plaintiff ’s dog was killed by two stab wounds inflicted by 
different defendants, each of which would have been sufficient by itself to cause the death of the dog, Stevens 
asserts that the two defendants are each liable for ‘the value of the dog’ as ‘substitutive’ damages for their respective 
infringements of the plaintiff ’s right to the dog, and also for any consequential damages that are a ‘but for’ result 
of the dog’s death, but that double recovery is not permitted since ‘he only had one right to the dog’. ibid 134. Yet 
the ‘but for’ test can only establish each defendant’s causation of a distinct stab wound, not the death of the dog, 
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The courts and the secondary literature generally do not qualify the consequence by 
specifying its non-salient details or the time, location or manner of its occurrence when 
describing or applying the sine qua non analysis.65 Instead, in overdetermined causation 
situations they either reach incorrect conclusions on natural causation by using an unqual-
ified sine qua non analysis66 or employ question-begging, conclusory phrases – for example, 
‘substantial factor’, ‘material contribution’ or ‘common sense causation’67 – that confusingly 
merge the scientific issue of causal contribution with the normative issue of the appropri-
ate extent of legal responsibility for the consequences of one’s (legally relevant) conduct 
while failing to provide any test or guidance for resolving either issue.68
Philosophers have attempted to defend the sine qua non account and the usual employ-
ment of counterfactual analysis in that account by shifting the focus of the analysis from 
the occurrence of the consequence at issue to the occurrence of each step in the competing 
causal sequences. This attempt abandons (without acknowledgement) strong necessity in 
favour of a deficient version of weak necessity. Moreover, it works only in ‘early pre- 
emption’ situations, in which the pre-emption of the pre-empted causal sequence occurs 
before the completion of the completed causal sequence. It does not work in ‘late pre-
emption’ situations, in which the pre-emption of the pre-empted causal sequence occurs at 
the same time as (or after) the completion of the completed causal sequence, nor in any 
duplicative causation situation.69 In the duplicative causation situations, some sine qua non 
advocates hold fast. They assert that neither of the duplicative conditions was a cause and 
that the alleged consequence is either an uncaused miracle or was caused by the conjunc-
tion of the duplicative conditions although neither by itself was a cause.70
and thus it cannot support holding either defendant liable for ‘substitutive’ damages for the full ‘value of the dog’ 
or for consequential damages caused by the dog’s death. Rather, under the individually applied ‘but for’ test that 
Stevens claims to be applying, each defendant can only be held liable for the ‘substitutive’ value of the rights 
infringement that is constituted by his or her stabbing of the dog, however that might be valued, and any conse-
quential damages (of which there likely will be none) that are a ‘but for’ result of his or her distinct rights infringe-
ment. Moreover, although there is ‘only one right to the dog’, it is a right that each defendant has separately and 
distinctly infringed, and thus, under Stevens’ odd damages theory, each defendant should be fully but separately, 
rather than concurrently, liable for ‘substitutive’ damages for his or her distinct rights infringement, regardless of 
any resulting ‘double recovery’.
65 See eg, Restatement Third (n 1) § 26; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 432(1) (1965); Hart and Honoré (n 5) 
xlii; Honoré (n 1) 378–79; n 48 above. Stapleton, rather than I, ‘falls into manifest error’ when she asserts other-
wise. See Stapleton (n 1) 452 and fn 42.
66 See Wright, Legal Responsibility (n 9) 1438–40; RW Wright, ‘Liability for Possible Wrongs: Causation, 
Statistical Probability, and the Burden of Proof ’ (2008) 31 Loyola Los Angeles Law Review 1295, 1321–24.
67 eg March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 99 ALR 423 (High Court of Australia) (‘material contribution’ 
and ‘common sense’); Athey v Leonati (1996) 3 SCR 458 (Supreme Court of Canada) (‘materially contributed’); 
Sew Hoy & Sons Ltd v Coopers & Lybrand (1996) 1 NZLR 392 (New Zealand Court of Appeal) (‘material contribu-
tion’); Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32 (‘material contribution’); 
Kingston v Chicago & Northwestern Ry Co (1927) 211 NW 913 (Supreme Court of Wisconsin) (‘substantial fac-
tor’); Mitchell v Gonzales (1991) 819 P 2d 872 (Supreme Court of California) (‘substantial factor’).
68 Wright (n 5) 1742–50, 1781–88; Wright, Once More (n 14) 1073–80; Wright (n 3) 1012–14.
69 See J Collins, ‘Preemptive Preemption’ in Collins, Hall and Paul (n 9) 107, 109–10; Collins, Hall and 
Paul, Introduction (n 9) 18, 22–24, 32–33; Schaffer (n 14) 67–70. Philosophers tend to focus on overdetermined 
causation situations involving pre-emptive rather than duplicative causation. eg Collins, Hall and Paul, 
Introduction (n 9); Hall (n 14); Schaffer (n 14); Lewis (n 53) 80–82; Thomson (n 1) 144, 150–51, 152–59.
70 See Collins, Hall and Paul, Introduction (n 9) 32–33; Lewis (n 53) 80; Mackie (n 9) 47. David Coady adopts 
the latter position for pre-empted conditions as well as duplicative causes. Coady (n 53) 326–28.
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III. ALLeged defIcIencIes of The ness AccounT
A. Spurious Weak Necessity
A common counter-example to the NESS account is the alleged conversion of a causally 
irrelevant condition c into a NESS condition by replacing a causally relevant condition b 
with two conditions, one of which is c and the other of which is a disjunction of b with the 
negation of c.71 For example, if D’s cutting off C’s head was a necessary condition for C’s 
death (or for the sufficiency of a set S of conditions sufficient for C’s death), D’s beheading 
C is replaced with the following two conditions:
1. Napoleon married Josephine.
2. Either Napoleon did not marry Josephine or D beheaded C.
Given the disjunction in condition 2, the set S is not sufficient for C’s death unless we also 
include condition 1, so, apparently, Napoleon’s marrying of Josephine is (erroneously) 
treated as a cause of C’s death under the NESS account.
To counter this logical manoeuvre, Fumerton and Kress propose excluding from the set 
S of sufficient conditions any condition (such as condition 2 above) that contains a truth-
functional constituent part (such as ‘D beheaded C’) that by itself is lawfully sufficient for 
the consequence.72 Without condition 2, S is no longer a sufficient set, so condition 1 is not 
a NESS condition. To be generally effective, this analytic counter needs to be broadened to 
exclude as a constituent part of any disjunctive condition in S a condition that is sufficient 
when conjoined with all the other conditions in S other than the condition with which it is 
disjoined. However, such appended analytic restrictions not only seem ad hoc, they also are 
unnecessary given restrictions that are already embedded in the NESS account.
The requirement that a NESS condition be an actually existing condition rules out as a 
constituent part of any NESS condition the negation of any actually existing condition. 
Napoleon’s marrying Josephine can be tentatively included in S as condition 1 only if it was 
an actually existing condition, but if it was then Napoleon’s not marrying Josephine in con-
dition 2 cannot be true, so condition 2 collapses down to the actual condition of D’s 
beheading C, thereby making condition 1 not necessary for the sufficiency of S.
The logical manoeuvre that creates the spurious weak necessity is similarly precluded by 
the NESS account’s requirement that each condition in S be part of the instantiation of a 
condition in a fully instantiated causal law. As Michael Strevens states in his revision of 
Mackie’s INUS account in a way that makes it similar to the NESS account,
it is not enough that a set of conditions be sufficient for the occurrence of e; it must be causally 
sufficient for e. . . . Causal sufficiency ought to be defined, then, so that a set of conditions is causally 
sufficient for an event e only if the conditions represent a causal process that produces e. A set of 
conditions entailing e represents a causal process producing e, I propose, just in case each step in 
the entailment corresponds to a strand in the relevant causal web. . . .
[T]he step from the [statement of the causally irrelevant condition] and the disjunction [of the 
causally relevant condition and the negation of the causally irrelevant condition] to the [conse-
quent] . . . is not a causal entailment, as it does not correspond to a causal process recognized by 
71 eg Thomson (n 1) 151; cf Lewis (n 53) 77.
72 Fumerton and Kress (n 1) 95; Moore (n 1) 487–88.
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the laws of physics. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a physics in which something in the world cap-
tured by the description ¬r [or] c could be part of any story about causal influence. . . . [W]hen 
what we regard as an intuitively irrelevant factor r is made essential to the entailment of an event e, 
it is always by way of disjunction or other logical construction that links r and e truth-functionally 
but not causally.
The approach to causal claims taken by my revision of Mackie’s account puts a considerable 
burden on the physical laws; they must determine what primitive causal connections there are in 
the world, hence determine the structure of the causal web. I think that they are quite capable of 
bearing that load, and that we do indeed look to the laws as the final arbiters on any question of 
causal connection.73
This third counter to the logical manoeuvre that creates spurious weak necessity has 
been criticised as being circular, since it assumes the prior specification of a ‘relevant causal 
web’, the structure of which is determined by reference to the ‘physical laws’.74 However, the 
NESS account does not refer circularly to causally relevant conditions or causal laws. It 
specifies the method for identifying causally relevant conditions – they must be instantia-
tions of abstract conditions listed in the antecedent of an empirically derived causal law – 
and its definition of a ‘causal law’ does not employ causal terminology.75
B. Causal Directionality (No ‘Backtracking’)
When the sun is at a 45 degree angle to an upright flagpole and the shadow of the flagpole 
on the ground is 5 feet long, the laws of geometry and nature entail that the flagpole is 
5 feet tall. However, as Fumerton and Kress state, ‘it would surely be mistaken to claim that 
the shadow causes the flagpole to be [5] feet tall. If anything, the direction of causation is 
from the flagpole’s height to the length of the shadow’.76 Although Fumerton and Kress and 
others assume otherwise, this conclusion is correctly reached under the NESS account, 
which insists that singular instances of causation always involve the complete instantiation 
of an empirically derived causal law and that causal laws state a direction of causation, 
whereby the complete instantiation of the conditions in the antecedent of the causal law 
cause the instantiation of the consequent of the causal law, not vice versa.77 Fumerton and 
Kress and others claim that the reference to causal laws and their inherent directionality is 
viciously circular.78 However, as I have discussed above, this is not true.79
73 Strevens (n 13) 113–14; see Collins, Hall and Paul, Introduction (n 9) 22 (‘we should say that the disjunctive 
event is not an event at all, hence not apt to cause (or be caused)’); Moore (n 1) 355–56 (same).
74 Thomson (n 1) 152–53.
75 See text to nn 25–29 above.
76 Fumerton and Kress (n 1) 102. Fumerton, Kress and Moore have the geometry wrong; they state that the 
flagpole must be 10 feet tall. ibid 93, 101–02; Moore (n 1) 476–77, 483.
77 See text to nn 25–33 above.
78 See n 2 above; cf Lewis (n 53) 77. Moore acknowledges that the directionality of causal laws is inherent in our 
concept of causation and can be used to reject the criticisms of the NESS account discussed in this section and the 
next section. However, he claims that referring to this directionality or to causal laws per se to elucidate the mean-
ing of causation is viciously circular. He thus commends Mackie for treating this directionality, which Mackie calls 
‘causal priority’, as an addition to, rather than as an essential constitutive element of, the sense of sufficiency 
employed in causal analysis. Moore (n 1) 482–85. Mackie acknowledged the use of the more discriminating sense 
of causal sufficiency in common discourse, but he thought it better for clarity’s sake to reserve ‘sufficiency’ for 
mere lawful sufficiency. Mackie (n 9) 51–53. See ibid 190–92 for Mackie’s analysis of causal priority.
79 See text to nn 25–34 above.
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C. Epiphenomena (Collateral Effects of a Common Cause)
When a condition is a common cause of two different causal sequences, employing mere 
lawful strong sufficiency rather than causal sufficiency can result in erroneously treating 
conditions in one sequence as causes of the conditions in the other sequence, and vice 
versa.80 A frequently mentioned example is Mackie’s ‘hooters’ hypothetical, in which the 
horns (‘hooters’) at a Manchester factory and a London factory each sound at five o’clock 
every workday afternoon, signalling the stoppage of work at their respective locations. A few 
moments later, workers begin to exit from each factory. The sounding of the horn at the 
Manchester factory is lawfully strongly sufficient for its being five o’clock, and its being five 
o’clock is lawfully strongly sufficient for the sounding of the horn and the exodus moments 
later of workers at the London factory. Thus, the sounding of the horn at the Manchester fac-
tory is lawfully strongly sufficient for the sounding of the horn and exodus of workers 
moments later at the London factory.81 But it is not a cause of these events at the London fac-
tory, as the NESS account correctly concludes, because it is not causally sufficient. Neither 
horn’s sounding, nor even its existence, is part of the instantiation of the antecedent of any 
causal generalisation for which the consequent is the state of its being five o’clock. As we have 
empirically determined, the direction of causation runs the other way.82
D. Pre-emptive Causation
The NESS account has been criticised for allegedly being unable to handle properly some 
types of pre-emptive causation situations. Once again, the criticisms erroneously assume 
that the NESS account merely requires lawful sufficiency, rather than causal sufficiency.83 
Consider some common examples:
1.  C is a traveller in the desert, whose only source of water is a keg full of water. A adds a 
fatal dose of undetectable poison to the water in the keg, for which there is no antidote. 
C remains unaware of the poison in the water. Subsequently, before C drinks any of the 
poisoned water, B dumps the poisoned water out of the keg. When C attempts to drink 
water from the keg, she discovers that it is empty. C dies due to dehydration.
2.  C drinks a fatal dose of poison for which there is no antidote but which takes several 
hours to produce death. While C is still alive, D shoots C in the head. C dies a few min-
utes later from the bullet wound, well before the time at which the death by poisoning 
would otherwise have occurred.
3.  A ship is traveling down a river to deliver goods to Metropolis by a specific date. The ship 
is unable to arrive by that date, since its crew must and does stop when it reaches bridge 
A, which had collapsed into and blocked the river. The ship would not have been able to 
reach Metropolis on time even if bridge A had not collapsed, due to another collapsed 
bridge, bridge B, of which the ship’s crew was unaware, located on the river between 
bridge A and Metropolis.
80 Collins, Hall and Paul, Introduction (n 9) 17–18; Fumerton and Kress (n 1) 93, 101; Lewis (n 53) 77; Mackie 
(n 9) 33–34.
81 Mackie (n 9) 83–86; Moore (n 1) 481–82.
82 Strevens (n 13) 108–09; Wright (n 5) 1808–09.
83 Fumerton and Kress (n 1) 100–02; Moore (n 1) 474; Thomson (n 1) 148–51.
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If we merely require lawful sufficiency and do not qualify the consequence by the time of 
its occurrence – or, in examples 1 and 3, perhaps even if we do84 – we would incorrectly 
treat the poison as well as the emptying of the keg in example 1, the poison as well as the 
shooting in example 2, and the collapse of bridge B as well as the collapse of bridge A in 
example 3 as duplicative causes of the relevant consequence (respectively, death, death, and 
failure to reach Metropolis on time). In each example, either condition guarantees the 
occurrence of the (abstractly described) consequence and thus is lawfully sufficient for its 
occurrence.85 On the other hand, if we require strong necessity – that the condition ‘made a 
difference’ as a ‘but for’ cause – we would be forced to conclude that neither condition was 
a cause.
In the NESS account, we require causal sufficiency rather than strong necessity or mere 
lawful strong sufficiency. For causal sufficiency, the condition at issue must be part of the 
instantiation of a fully instantiated causal law that is part of a sequence of such fully instan-
tiated causal laws that link the condition at issue with the consequence.86 The instantiated 
causal laws that constitute the sequence are usually referred to incompletely and elliptically 
in the form of a causal generalisation.87
In example 1, the causal generalisation for death by poisoning includes the victim’s 
drinking the poison, a condition that was not instantiated since the keg was emptied before 
C was able to drink from it. On the other hand, the causal generalisation and the underly-
ing causal laws for death by dehydration, which include as a necessary condition lack of 
water (and the physical bodily processes that occur as a result of the lack of water), were 
fully instantiated. Thus, B’s emptying of the keg, but not A’s poisoning of its contents, 
caused C’s death, even though C may have lived longer due to the emptying of the keg.88
Jane Stapleton states that there is substantial disagreement about this conclusion.89 Hart 
and Honoré initially rejected it, but only because they erroneously equated causing death 
with shortening life.90 Honoré eventually focused on the details of the competing causal 
processes and applied a causal sufficiency analysis to reach the correct conclusion:
[I]f we know enough about the stages by which the events came about we can generally tell, even 
in cases of over-determination, which causal process ran its course and which was frustrated. So in 
the case of the desert traveler . . . it now seems to me that B causes C’s death. . . . B’s conduct intro-
duces a condition, lack of water, that in the circumstances . . . is sufficient to bring about and does 
bring about C’s death from dehydration.91
Stapleton initially claimed that A, instead of or in addition to B, can be treated as a cause 
of C’s death, or that one can plausibly argue that neither was a cause of C’s death – the 
84 See text to nn 48–56 above.
85 See Fumerton and Kress (n 1) 100–02; Collins, Hall and Paul, Introduction (n 9) 18; Lewis (n 53) 80; 
J Stapleton, ‘Perspectives on Causation’ in Jeremy Horder (ed), Oxford Essays on Jurisprudence: Fourth Series 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) 61, 82–84; Thomson (n 1) 150–51; Wright (n 13) 298–300, 305.
86 See text to nn 27–29, 40 and 73 above.
87 See text to n 35 above.
88 Becht and Miller (n 53) 205–10; Mackie (n 9) 44–46; Wright (n 5) 1802. I now believe that my opposite con-
clusion, in Wright (n 5) 1802, for McLaughlin’s original version of this hypothetical, in which A emptied the keg 
and refilled it with salt and B subsequently stole the keg before C attempted to drink from it, is wrong for reasons 
set out in section III.I below.
89 Stapleton (n 1) 439 fn 15. Since Moore refuses to treat negative conditions such as lack of water as causes 
or effects, he denies that either A or B caused C’s death, thereby treating the death as an uncaused miracle. Moore 
(n 1) 144, 466–67; see section III.H below.
90 See Hart and Honoré (n 5) 239–41 and fn 74.
91 Honoré (n 1) 378; see Honoré (n 10) 7-133.
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occurrence of which thus is an unexplained miracle.92 She later claimed (and apparently 
still does) that both A and B were causes. Her arguments for treating A as a cause fail to 
distinguish guaranteeing an outcome (here, death) from actually causing the outcome and 
erroneously assert that a lack of ‘potable’ or ‘fresh’ (unpoisoned) water is the same as a lack 
of water, while failing to focus on what actually caused C not to drink the water.93 Even if we 
follow Stapleton by speculating about counterfactual scenarios rather than focusing on 
what actually happened, the poisoning of the water would not have caused C not to drink 
the water if the keg had not been emptied, since, under the usual understanding of the 
example, the poison was not detectable.94
A similar analysis applies in example 2, in which C actually drank the fatal dose of poison 
but was shot and killed before the poison had time to have fatal effect. The empirically 
derived causal generalisation for death by poisoning includes as a necessary condition, in 
addition to the person’s drinking the poison, a minimum amount of time of the person’s 
thereafter being alive: the time, determined empirically, that is required for the poison to 
have fatal effect, that is, for certain internal bodily processes to occur. (Strictly speaking, the 
occurrence of these bodily processes, rather than the passage of a certain amount of time, 
are the NESS conditions in the underlying causal laws; however, in causal generalisations 
we can and often do substitute for the bodily processes the time required for them to occur, 
especially when we have insufficient knowledge of the required bodily processes.) In exam-
ple 2, the would-be poisoning victim is shot and dies after drinking the poison but before 
the specified required time of remaining alive in order for the poison to have fatal effect has 
elapsed. On the other hand, the causal generalisation and the underlying causal laws for 
death by shooting were fully instantiated.95
In example 3, the relevant causal generalisation for a ship’s being delayed by a bridge’s 
blocking the river includes the bridge’s collapsing into and blocking the river, the ship’s 
reaching the bridge while the bridge is blocking the river, and the ship’s crew’s seeing the 
bridge’s blocking of the river and stopping the ship before it runs into the bridge. This 
causal generalisation was fully instantiated for bridge A, but not for bridge B. Although 
bridge B’s collapsing into and blocking the river guarantees and thus is lawfully sufficient 
for the ship’s being delayed and not reaching a point beyond the bridge by a certain time, it 
is not causally sufficient since all the antecedent conditions in the ‘if ’ part of the relevant 
causal generalisation involving bridge B were not instantiated: the ship did not reach bridge 
B, and the ship’s crew did not see bridge B blocking the river.96
Michael Moore acknowledges that the NESS account reaches the proper conclusion in a 
non-circular, non-question-begging way in ‘early pre-emption’ situations. His examples of 
92 See Stapleton (n 85) 82–84.
93 ibid; J Stapleton, ‘Unpacking “Causation” ’ in P Cane and J Gardner (eds), Relating to Responsibility (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2001) 145, 178–83. For further elaboration of the flaws in Stapleton’s arguments, see Wright 
(n 13) 298–300, 305; Wright, Once More (n 14) 1115–20.
94 See Stapleton (n 93) 178 (poison was ‘odourless’). If C did not know that the keg had been emptied but did 
not attempt to drink from it because she knew the water in it had been poisoned, A’s poisoning of the water rather 
than B’s emptying of the keg was the pre-emptive cause of C’s death. See section III.I below.
95 Fumerton and Kress (n 1) 100; Hart and Honoré (n 5) 124; Honoré (n 10) 7-130, 7-134; Thomson (n 1) 151; 
Wright (n 5) 1795.
96 Fumerton and Kress (n 1) 100–01; Hart and Honoré (n 5) 250–51; Wright (n 5) 1796–97. Hart and Honoré 
agree that bridge A but not bridge B caused the boat’s delay; however, they claim that bridge A did not cause any 
financial loss resulting from the delay if bridge B’s collapse was not wrongfully caused. Hart and Honoré (n 5) 251. 
They have confused the causation issue with the normative issue of legal responsibility. Wright (n 5) 1797–98; 
Wright, Legal Responsibility (n 9) 1434–67.
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early pre-emption are a two-fires case, in which ‘the first fire burns all the fuel around the 
house, so the second fire cannot get to the house to burn it’, and a case that is similar to 
example 1, in which ‘the shooter shoots the victim before he drinks any of the poisoned 
tea’.97 He states:
One of the conditions needed to complete the set of which the second fire/poisoning was a part, 
was the fuel leading up to the house/the drinking of the tea by the victim. Therefore, there is no set 
(of which setting the fire/poisoning the tea are members) that is truly sufficient for death. Missing 
are some positive conditions, conditions not described in question-begging causal terms. 
Sufficiency theorists thus can get the right answers in cases of early pre-emption.98
However, Moore claims that attempts to use the NESS account to resolve the causal issue 
in ‘late pre-emption’ situations are circular and question-begging, because they allegedly 
simply amount to requiring that the effect was not already caused by something else.99 His 
distinction between early pre-emption and late pre-emption is significantly different from 
the usual one. For Moore, early pre-emption situations are those in which ‘the pre-emptive 
cause removes something needed by the pre-empted factor to do any causal work’, while 
late pre-emption cases are those in which ‘there is no last event needed by the pre-empted 
factor and prevented by the pre-empting cause, save the ultimate effect itself ’.100 He treats 
the poison–shooting situation in example 2 above and a two-fires case in which the 
pre-empted fire approaches the already destroyed house from an opposite direction than 
the pre-emptive fire (and thus shares no fuel on the way to the doomed house) as late 
pre-emption cases,101 and he claims that attempts to apply the NESS account in such cases 
by specifying, as alleged necessary conditions in the antecedent of the relevant causal gen-
eralisation, conditions such as ‘the house exists at the time the second fire arrived at the site’ 
or ‘the poison remaining in [the would-be victim P’s] body a certain amount of time while 
she is still alive’ are simply disguised circularity, since
the house existing, or [P’s] still being alive, is just there not being a house destruction or a death – 
and this, in a deterministic universe, is to say nothing else (other than the putative cause we are 
testing) caused such destruction or death.102
Moore’s argument ignores the distinction between the necessary conditions in the ante-
cedent of a causal generalisation and the distinct condition that constitutes the consequent 
of the causal generalisation. Although to say that an entity exists or is alive at a certain time 
obviously entails (in our world) that nothing has caused the entity’s destruction or death 
prior to that time, it should also be obvious that the entity’s existence or being alive at a 
certain time is a state of affairs that is distinct from and not simply the converse of the 
destruction, death or non-existence of the entity at a later (remote or immediate) time;103 
rather, it is one of the necessary but by itself insufficient conditions for the occurrence of 
the later event or state of affairs. As Collins, Hall and Paul explain,
97 Moore (n 1) 493.
98 ibid.
99 ibid 494–95.
100 ibid 493. See text to n 69 above for the usual distinction between early pre-emption and late pre-emption.
101 Moore (n 1) 493–94.
102 ibid 494.
103 It is unfortunate that on this issue Moore fails to recognise or employ the rigorous distinction between dis-
tinct states of affairs that he correctly employs in distinguishing between acts and consequences to rebut various 
arguments by criminal theorists earlier in his book. See ibid 14–19, 282.
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When Suzy throws a rock at the window, breaking it, we naturally tend to think that there is just 
one sequence of events – the one initiated by Suzy’s throw – converging on the effect. But it is far 
better, at least for the purpose of systematic metaphysics, to see this effect standing at the intersec-
tion of two sequences of events: There is the interesting sequence just mentioned, and then there is 
the quite boring sequence consisting in the continued presence of the window, up to the moment 
it shatters. More generally, a proper theory of events almost certainly must count as such things 
that we ordinarily would classify as states, or standing or background conditions.104
In the two-fires example, the house’s destruction is an instantiation of the consequent of 
the causal generalisation for destruction by fire, which will occur only if all of the necessary 
conditions in the antecedent of that causal generalisation and its underlying causal laws are 
instantiated. The existence of the house as fuel when a fire reaches it is one of those neces-
sary antecedent conditions, as much as the existence of the other fuel along the fire’s path 
to the house. All of the antecedent conditions were instantiated for the first fire to reach the 
house. At least one – the existence of the house when the fire reached it – was not instanti-
ated with respect to the second fire, which arrived too late from the opposite direction.
The same analysis applies in the poison–shooting hypothetical. The NESS account 
requires that we empirically determine, as best we can, what set of conditions is minimally 
sufficient for a certain causal process to occur. By empirical observation and experimenta-
tion, we determine that a specific minimal amount of time is required for a specific poison 
to have fatal effect after the would-be victim drinks the poison. If we knew enough about 
the causal process involved, we could (but, as a practical matter, need not) replace this 
required elapsed time by the NESS conditions for which it is a placeholder: the steps of the 
physical process that must occur inside the victim’s body during this elapsed time. The 
victim’s remaining alive for the specified amount of time is included as one of the necessary 
conditions when specifying the causal generalisation. When we later investigate whether 
the poison caused the death in a particular situation, we check to see whether every one of 
the conditions specified in the antecedent of the causal generalisation was instantiated on 
the particular occasion. The elapsed time condition was not, so the complete instantiation 
required for causal sufficiency is not satisfied. Although we rely on our prior empirically 
derived causal generalisations, there is no circularity in our definition, identification or 
application of those generalisations.
Moore’s examples of late pre-emption actually are instances of early pre-emption given 
his definitions of those terms. Indeed, there are no actual pre-emption situations that fit 
Moore’s definition of late pre-emption, which rather is swallowed up by his definition of 
early pre-emption. Recall that he distinguishes late pre-emption situations from early 
pre-emption situations by the fact that, in the former, ‘there is no last event needed by the 
pre-empted factor and prevented by the pre-empting cause, save the ultimate effect itself ’.105 
In both his two-fires hypothetical and his poison-shooting hypothetical, there is an ‘event’ 
104 Collins, Hall and Paul, Introduction (n 9) 44; see Fumerton and Kress (n 1) 90 (‘John’s stabbing Mary in the 
heart caused her death because it was a necessary element in a set of actual conditions – including her being alive 
at the time that she was stabbed’); Hall (n 14) 231 (‘among the causes of the June [forest] fire is not just the light-
ning but also the very presence of the forest, filled with flammable material’); ibid 244 (noting that the causal 
history of a bombing by a plane includes the process of the flying of the plane and ‘less conspicuously, the process 
consisting in the persistence of the target’); Strevens (n 13) 103–04 (a jar must be in existence when a ball reaches 
it in order for the throw of the ball to cause the shattering of the jar); Thomson (n 1) 149 (including in a causal 
generalisation for a thrown rock’s breaking of a window the condition of the window’s remaining in the place 
where it was when the rock was thrown for at least the amount of time it would take the rock, thrown at a specified 
velocity, to reach that place).
105 See text to n 100 above.
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(a state of affairs) needed by the pre-empted factor and prevented by the pre-empting cause 
– the existence of the house when the second fire reaches it and the would-be victim’s 
remaining alive for a specific amount of time after drinking the poison, respectively – that 
is not the ‘the ultimate effect itself ’ (the destruction of the house or the death of the victim, 
respectively) and may not even have been the last event or state of affairs needed by the 
pre-empted factor in order for it to be a cause. Consider, for example, the necessity of 
the house’s not only still being in existence when the second fire arrives but also being suf-
ficiently dry and remaining so for some period thereafter and with sufficient oxygen (nec-
essary for combustion) being present and remaining present for some period thereafter.
Moore discusses a modified version of the two-bridges hypothetical as an example of a 
third, supposedly distinctive, ‘trumping’ type of pre-emption that he claims creates the 
worst problems for the NESS account, since pre-emption allegedly exists even though 
the pre-empted factor ‘runs its whole course’.106 Moore changes the hypothetical by having 
the boat’s captain be aware of both collapsed bridges prior to the stopping of the boat, 
although he continues to assume that the captain stopped the boat solely because of the 
collapse of bridge A.107 This is a plausible assumption, especially if, after becoming aware of 
the collapse of both bridges, the captain proceeded down the river until he reached bridge 
A. However, it could also be the case that the captain’s knowledge of the collapse of bridge 
B was a duplicative, reinforcing positive reason for, and hence a cause of, his stopping the 
boat, rather than a pre-empted factor.108
The second, reinforcement rather than pre-emption, description of the causal situation 
seems more likely in the other example of ‘trumping’ pre-emption that Moore discusses, 
which also has been discussed by Jonathan Schaffer. In this example, a major and a sergeant 
each simultaneously order the same soldiers to advance. Schaffer and Moore assume that 
the soldiers advance solely due to the order of the major, although they normally would 
have obeyed the sergeant’s order.109 While the major’s order will (or should) pre-empt the 
sergeant’s order when their orders conflict, when their orders are consistent it seems to me 
that the sergeant’s order will continue to be a positive reason for advancing that reinforces 
the reason provided by the major’s order, rather than its being completely without effect.110
Nevertheless, if we assume, along with Schaffer and Moore, that the soldiers advanced 
solely due to the major’s order, no new type of pre-emption has been discovered and no 
new difficulties are created for the NESS account. The applicable causal generalisation is 
assumed to contain as a necessary antecedent condition for the effectiveness of an order 
that it be the highest-ranking relevant order. This antecedent condition was instantiated for 
the generalisation as applied to the major’s order, but not for the same generalisation as 
applied to the sergeant’s order, which thus, contrary to Moore’s assumption, did not ‘run its 
whole course’.111 If the sergeant’s order indeed had ‘run its whole course’ – that is, if the 
relevant causal laws were fully instantiated by a set of conditions including the sergeant’s 
106 Moore (n 1) 494–95.
107 ibid 495. Moore treats my previously published analysis of the original version of this hypothetical as if it 
were my analysis of his modified version of the hypothetical. ibid.
108 See section III.F below.
109 Moore (n 1) 494–95; Schaffer (n 14) 67; see Coady (n 53) 333–35; Lewis (n 53) 81.
110 See section III.F below.
111 The same analysis applies to Schaffer’s primary illustration of trumping pre-emption, which assumes that a 
necessary condition in the antecedent of the relevant causal law for the effectiveness of a magical spell is that it be 
the first spell cast during the relevant time period. Schaffer (n 14) 59; see Lewis (n 53) 81. It also applies to Collins, 
Hall and Paul’s neuron example, which assumes a causal law according to which a neuron fires with the same 
polarity as the most intense incoming signal. Collins, Hall and Paul, Introduction (n 9) 27–28.
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order but not the major’s order – then the sergeant’s order (as well as the major’s order) was 
a cause of the soldiers’ advance.112 As John Collins states, examples like this offered to illus-
trate a supposed distinct type of pre-emption ‘owe what plausibility they have to a confu-
sion of causes with norms – the only sense in which a major’s order clearly trumps a 
sergeant’s order rather than pre-empting it in some other way is a normative sense’.113
For proper resolution of the two-bridges hypothetical, as modified by Moore, we need to 
know more about the thought processes in the captain’s brain. If he was determined to 
proceed down the river until forced to stop by a physical obstruction, then the relevant 
causal generalisation includes as a necessary antecedent condition the boat’s reaching the 
physical obstruction. This condition was instantiated with respect to bridge A but not with 
respect to bridge B, so bridge A’s collapse, but not bridge B’s collapse, was a cause of the 
boat’s stopping and thus of the delay in reaching Metropolis. If, instead, the captain’s learn-
ing of a blockage of the river was causally sufficient for his stopping the boat as soon as he 
learned of the blockage (or at the nearest convenient stopping point short of the first block-
age), then bridge A’s collapse and bridge B’s collapse (more precisely, his knowledge of or 
belief regarding each collapse) were duplicative causes of the boat’s stopping and the delay 
in reaching Metropolis. If, on the other hand, as implicitly assumed by Moore, the relevant 
causal generalisation includes as a necessary antecedent condition not only knowledge of 
an obstruction but also that the knowledge be knowledge of the nearest known obstruc-
tion, then (knowledge of) bridge A’s collapse, but not bridge B’s collapse, was a cause of the 
stopping of the boat and the delay in reaching Metropolis.
E. Duplicative Causation
It is generally acknowledged that the NESS account, by requiring causal strong sufficiency 
rather than strong necessity, properly handles situations involving duplicative causation by 
two or more independently strongly sufficient conditions, such as two independently suf-
ficient fires or floods that merge and destroy a building, which the sine qua non account 
mishandles since none of the conditions ‘made a difference’ by being a ‘but for’ cause.114 
However, some have questioned the NESS account’s handling of a condition that was not, 
or could not be proven to be, either strongly necessary or independently strongly sufficient 
– eg, each of 10 drops of poison or discharges of pollution when only three such drops or 
discharges were necessary for the occurrence of the relevant harm. Such situations are quite 
common – eg, in the frequent cases of multiple fires, flood waters, noises, weights, pollut-
ants, toxic substances and other conditions that combine to cause a particular harm115 or a 
more-than-sufficient number of individual affirmative votes under non-unanimity voting 
rules.116
112 cf Strevens (n 13) 104 (‘If there were a set of veridical conditions entailing that the mother’s [supposedly 
pre-empted] ball hits the jar, it would indeed have hit the jar. But then it would, intuitively, be a cause of the break-
ing, in which case Mackie’s [weak-necessity] account would be correct in deeming it so.’)
113 Collins (n 69) 114. Schaffer acknowledges that this example could be a case of ‘standard pre-emption’, in 
which causal processes in the soldiers’ brains filter out the sergeant’s order or only respond to highest-ranked 
orders. Schaffer (n 14) 67.
114 eg Fumerton and Kress (n 1) 96–97; Moore (n 1) 474. There is considerable disagreement over its ability to 
handle overdetermined failure of a causal process. See section III.I below.
115 Wright, Legal Responsibility (n 9) 1444–45; text to nn 10–11 and 40–41 above.
116 See Stapleton (n 1) 443.
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My initial elaborations of the NESS account handled these situations by using subsets of 
existing conditions or ‘at least so much’ descriptions of an existing condition to construct 
minimally sufficient sets of existing conditions, for the sufficiency of which the inclusion 
of the non-independently-sufficient condition was necessary.117 Some critics have 
objected that doing so involves hypothetical, counterfactual reasoning – in particular, an 
assumption that the conditions not included in the described subset or the at-least-so-
much nature of an included existing condition did not actually exist.118 This is not true. The 
non-included existing conditions or greater-than-at-least-so-much nature of an included 
condition are simply ‘roped off ’ while determining whether the described existing condi-
tions constituted a minimally sufficient set. Indeed, I have always emphasised that one 
must double-check to make sure that the roped-off existing conditions or their roped-off 
nature did not prevent the complete instantiation of the antecedent of the relevant causal 
generalisation and its underlying causal laws.119
In any event, the objection to these methods of disaggregating existing conditions is 
mooted when the necessity aspect of the NESS account is confined, as it is in my later elabo-
rations of the NESS account, to the relevant causal generalisations and their under lying 
causal laws. Under this simpler, more straightforward definition of a NESS condition, no 
disaggregation of existing conditions is necessary. A NESS condition need merely be part of 
the instantiation of one of the abstract conditions in the antecedent of an applicable causal 
law, all the conditions of which were at least minimally instantiated. It does not matter if 
some or all of them were more than minimally instantiated, although – I again emphasise – 
care must be taken to ensure that the more-than-minimal instantiation of some antecedent 
condition did not prevent the instantiation of some other antecedent condition.120
Moore acknowledges the validity and usefulness of the NESS account’s ability to identify 
as causes conditions that were neither strongly necessary nor independently strongly suffi-
cient, while also noting and criticising the consequent increased proliferation of causes.121 
David Fischer also objects to the proliferation of causes and questions the validity of recog-
nising trivial contributions as causes – eg, a teaspoon of water added to a flooding river or 
a match added to a raging forest fire.122 Yet the teaspoon of water and the match contrib-
uted to and are part of the flood and forest fire, respectively. What if the same flood or fire 
117 Wright (n 5) 1792–94; Wright, Legal Responsibility (n 9) 1444–45; Wright, Once More (n 14) 1106–07; 
Wright (n 3) 1035–39. Fischer asserts that Warren v Parkhurst 92 NYS 725 (NY Sup Ct. 1904), affirmed 93 NYS 
1009 (NY App Div 1905), affirmed 78 NE 579 (NY 1906), which I have used to illustrate judicial recognition of 
causation by conditions that were neither necessary nor independently strongly sufficient, is not a ‘pure’ example. 
Relying on the distinction between ‘[legal] injury’ and ‘[actual] harm’ – a distinction the Warren court did not 
make – Fischer argues that, although the pollution by each of the 26 defendants was neither necessary nor inde-
pendently sufficient for the ‘fixed threshold of stench’ that constituted the required legal injury, each defendant’s 
pollution was necessary for some separable part of the recoverable harm. Fischer (n 1) 285. He ignores the court’s 
statements that each defendant’s pollution by itself ‘would not cause any material change to the plaintiff by way of 
noxious smell’ but rather would be ‘merely nominal’ and would not support any liability.
118 Kelman (n 1) 603–04; DA Fischer, ‘Causation in Fact in Omission Cases’ (1992) Utah Law Review 1335, 
1359, 1362; Fischer (n 1) 303–04, 307–08; Stapleton (n 85) 83–84.
119 eg Wright (n 13) 295–97; Wright, Legal Responsibility (n 9) 1444–45; Wright (n 3) 1035–37; see n 13 above. 
Strevens usefully discusses the difference between assuming the negation of some condition and simply setting it 
aside with no assumption as to whether or not it exists. Strevens (n 13) 96–97. Moore and Thomson recognise this 
distinction. Moore (n 1) 489–90; Thomson (n 1) 148, 156–59. Fischer and Stapleton do not. See Fischer (n 1) 
303–04, 307–08; Stapleton (n 1) 472.
120 See text to nn 40–41 above.
121 Moore (n 1) 487–91.
122 Fischer (n 1) 290–91; see Restatement Third (n 1) s 27 comment i (initially suggesting the correct causal analy-
sis but then analogising these duplicative causation situations to quite different pre-emptive causation situations).
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were caused by a million (or many more) different people all contributing a teaspoonful of 
water or a single match? Denying that any of the teaspoonfuls or matches contributed to 
the destruction of the property that was destroyed by the flood or fire would leave its 
destruction as an unexplained, non-caused miracle. As a pure matter of causation, it can-
not possibly matter whose hands supplied the different bits of water, flame or fuel. What is 
driving the intuition of no causation is the judgment regarding attributable responsibility, 
which is especially brought to mind if the question is posed as ‘Did the teaspoon of water 
or match destroy the property?’ rather than ‘Did the teaspoon of water or match contrib-
ute, even if only extremely minimally, to the flood or fire that destroyed the property?’ 
What is generally agreed upon is that the trivial contributor should not be held liable when 
her contribution was trivial in comparison to the other contributing conditions and was 
neither strongly necessary nor independently strongly sufficient for the injury at issue, but 
this is a normative issue of attributable responsibility rather than causal contribution.123
Stapleton also acknowledges the validity and usefulness of this application of the NESS 
account, but she claims that I have failed to provide any reasons or justifications for it – or 
at least for the law’s use of it – and have thereby (how?) made the NESS account 
‘incoherent’.124 To the contrary, the reasons that Stapleton gives for endorsing it, and the 
NESS account as a whole as the proper ‘algorithm’ for identifying causal ‘involvement’ or 
‘contribution’,125 are the same ones that I have repeatedly emphasised: the obvious need, in 
what is intended to be a comprehensive account of causation, to be able to identify all 
instances of causation, and the related need – especially in legal analysis – to distinguish the 
normative and context-specific purposive considerations that are often confused with the 
causation issue, which instead should be explicitly recognised, labelled and discussed as 
non-causal reasons for focusing on and attributing responsibility to only some of the many 
conditions that contributed to the occurrence of some consequence.126
It is Stapleton, rather than I, who has a history of failing to make this distinction.127 Her 
failures have been encouraged by Fischer, who refuses to distinguish between causation as a 
123 Restatement Third (n 1) s 36; Fischer (n 1) 289–90; Wright, Legal Responsibility (n 9) 1448–50 and fn 84.
124 Stapleton (n 1) 474–76.
125 ibid 444, 474; Stapleton (n 93) 174. However, Stapleton’s supposed elaboration of the NESS account differs 
greatly from that account by employing a doubly counterfactual ‘duplicate necessity’ analysis of strong necessity 
rather than a real-world analysis of causal sufficiency. She treats a condition as a cause if it would have been 
strongly necessary in the counterfactual world in which the condition(s) that prevented it from being strongly 
necessary in the real world did not exist. Stapleton (n 1) 433, 436, 441–44, 472–74, 479; J Stapleton, ‘Legal Cause: 
Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences’ (2001) 54 Vanderbilt Law Review 941, 959–60; 
Stapleton (n 93) 175–85. This method of analysis, which unfortunately is adopted in s 27 of the Restatement 
Third, fails to distinguish duplicative causation from pre-emptive causation and is substantially over-inclusive and 
under-inclusive in both types of situation. See Restatement Third (n 1) s 27; Wright, Once More (n 14) 1110–15 
and fn 149; Wright, Legal Responsibility (n 9) 1450–51 fn 86. The authors of the Restatement Third try to paper 
over these defects in comments that limit s 27 to duplicative causation situations, without providing any (non-
viciously-circular) criteria for distinguishing the two types of situations, and that refer pre-emptive causation sit-
uations to supposed resolution by s 26’s sine qua non test, which, however, cannot properly resolve pre-emptive 
causation situations. See Restatement Third (n 1) s 26 comment k, s 27 comments e and h. A recent case thus 
wisely moves past the blackletter sections of the Restatement Third to focus instead on the NESS-based ‘causal 
sets’ analysis that is employed in the comments to sections 26 and 27. June v Union Carbide Corp 577 F3d 1234, 
1242–44 (10th Cir 2009); see Restatement Third (n 1) s 26 comments c, d, i and k, s 27 comments a, b, e, f, g, h and 
i, and related reporters’ notes.
126 eg Wright (n 5) 1737–58, 1764 fn 121, 1781–83, 1791–92; Wright, Legal Responsibility (n 9) 1437–40; 
Wright, Once More (n 14) 1072–82, 1111, 1119–23; Wright (n 3) 1004–18; see Stapleton (n 1) 433, 441–42, 445–
46, 455–58, 463–64, 473–77, 479–80; section III.J below.
127 See Stapleton, Legal Cause (n 125) 957 fn 38, 966–68 and fns 60 and 61; Stapleton (n 85) 61, 62–66 and 
fn 13, 77 fn 40, 79–80, 81–84; Wright, Once More (n 14) 1101 fn 108, 1111–13, 1119–23.
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purely scientific matter and attributable legal responsibility and instead seeks to have 
‘causal’ judgments depend on intuitive judgments of legal responsibility, but who never-
theless ultimately agrees for practical reasons with the American Law Institute’s finally 
making this distinction in the Restatement Third (after having confused students, lawyers 
and courts for decades by its failure to do so in the first and second Restatements).128 
Stapleton, while now claiming to support the distinction, instead abandons it and under-
cuts her primary argument – that the law should choose ‘involvement’ (as identified by the 
NESS ‘algorithm’) as the sole ‘interrogation’ regarding ‘causation’ in the law129 – when she 
claims that there is no core empirical or metaphysical concept of causation, so that (as 
bluntly asserted by Lord Hoffmann at the conference at which the initial version of this 
chapter was presented), judges and others can and should define causation in any manner 
that suits their particular purposes:
[Schaffer’s attempt to provide an account of causation] is the same doomed concept of many other 
philosophers: a search for ‘a broad and nondiscriminatory concept’ of causation. In contrast to 
Schaffer’s passing flirtation with the idea that such a concept might be ‘a philosopher’s myth,’ the 
central argument of this article is that it is indeed a myth.130
It is futile for philosophers to search for a coherent freestanding metaphysical account of ‘causa-
tion’ unless a choice of underlying interrogation (blame, explanation, physical role, any sort of 
involvement etc) is specified at the outset.131
Stapleton’s seeming radical scepticism about there being any core concept of causation 
runs counter to her discussions of her concept of ‘involvement’, which she states is meant to 
encompass and be limited to the natural scientific relation that we call ‘causation’ and is 
determined objectively by reference to the physical laws of nature, excluding any normative 
considerations.132 As she seems to recognise, all the other ‘interrogations’ (regarding blame, 
responsibility, contextual salience and so forth) that loosely employ causal language use 
this core concept of causation but also use normative or other purposive or pragmatic con-
siderations to focus on only some of the contributing conditions and to limit attribution of 
responsibility even for those contributing conditions.133 While she often seems to argue 
otherwise,134 the purposive considerations that determine the particular focus of the causal 
enquiry do not result in different concepts of causation being employed once the focus has 
been set.135
128 See Fischer (n 1) 284–92, 312–13, 317; Wright, Once More (n 14) 1074–80, 1121 fn 172.
129 Stapleton (n 1) 433, 441–44, 455, 473–74; see nn 125–26 above.
130 Stapleton (n 1) 439 fn 15 (quoting J Schaffer, ‘Contrastive Causation’ (2005) 114 Philosophical Review 327, 
350).
131 ibid 439; see ibid 447 (same), 456 (‘causal language can denote whatever we choose it to’), 459 (same).
132 ibid 433–37, 444, 446, 452–53 and fn 45, 455, 474, 479–80. However, if by ‘physical laws of nature’ Stapleton 
means the mathematical formulations of such laws, which do not incorporate the critical interrelated concepts of 
causal sufficiency and directionality, she is relying on the inadequate notion of mere lawful relation. See Collins, 
Hall and Paul, Introduction (n 9) 16, 34; text to nn 80-87 above. In a note, she refers to theoretical physicist 
Richard Feynman’s description of physical laws in terms of ‘the principle of least action’ and restraints on and 
increasing entropy within a physical environment, but this is not a description that provides a basis for identifica-
tion of singular instances of causation in law or ordinary life. See Stapleton (n 1) 440 fn 16 (citing R Feynman, The 
Character of Physical Law (New York, Random House Modern Library, 1994) 46).
133 See Stapleton (n 1) 440–41, 444–46, 448–51, 455–64; Collins, Hall and Paul, Introduction (n 9) 36–37; 
Hall (n 14) 228–31; Fumerton and Kress (n 1) 87–88; Honoré (n 10) 7-49 to 7-53; Thomson (n 1) 160–63; Wright 
(n 5) 1741–50; Wright (n 3) 1011–14.
134 Stapleton (n 1) 437, 439–41 and fn 15, 444, 445–46, 447, 451, 476–77 and fn 149.
135 Wright (n 5) 1788–1803.
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Stapleton’s basic point seems to be that it is impossible to provide a comprehensive, non-
circular account of this core concept of causation – even though she seems to assume that 
her concept of ‘involvement’ has succeeded in doing so. More specifically, she asserts that, 
although the NESS account (which she claims to employ and in tight spots does employ) is 
a very useful ‘algorithm’ for identifying all instances of ‘involvement’, it does not capture the 
essence or meaning of causation.136 Yet, if, as she concedes,137 the NESS account is able to 
identify all instances of causation (and its lack) given sufficient information about existing 
conditions and the relevant causal laws, hasn’t it then (as she once stated138) captured the 
essence of causation and given it a comprehensive specification and meaning? Her claim 
that it has not seems to be based primarily on the charge that the NESS account, by refer-
ring to the interrelated concepts of ‘causal sufficiency’ and ‘causal laws’, engages in ‘vicious 
conceptual circularity’139 – a claim that I have rejected above,140 but which applies to her 
own ‘involvement’ account.141
F. Reasons as Causes
The NESS account’s ability to identify conditions that were neither strongly necessary nor 
independently strongly sufficient as causes applies to and is especially useful for accounting 
for human decisions and actions, which often are based on multiple reasons, none of which 
may have been – or can be proven to have been – strongly necessary or independently 
strongly sufficient for the particular decision or action.142
Hart and Honoré acknowledge that loose generalisations apply to human decisions and 
actions, but they deny that these decisions and actions are governed by causal laws. They 
point out that it is not practically possible to specify all the conditions sufficient to produce 
a certain decision, and they deny that the same decision or action necessarily would be 
taken in the same situation by the same person at different times or by different persons at 
the same or different times.143
The first point is true, but it does not differentiate human decisions and actions from 
other causal processes. We can and do make plausible singular causal statements based on 
incomplete knowledge of the causal laws that underlie the causal generalisations that we 
employ.144
136 Stapleton (n 1) 472–74 and fn 145, 477; contra Honoré (n 1) 367 (treating the NESS account as capturing 
the meaning of natural causation as well as being a useful test for identifying natural causes).
137 Stapleton (n 1) 444, 474.
138 Stapleton (n 93) 174, 179.
139 Stapleton (n 1) 472–73 and fn 145.
140 See nn 25–34 above.
141 Stapleton asserts that her use of the term ‘involvement’ ‘avoid[s] circular causal terminology’. Stapleton (n 1) 
436. Yet not only does ‘involvement’ imply causal contribution, she explicitly defines ‘involvement’ as ‘contribu-
tion’ in her delineation of her three forms of ‘involvement’, states that ‘involvement’ is determined through our 
knowledge of ‘the physical laws of nature’, for which she provides no usable definition or elaboration, and endorses 
the NESS account, with its allegedly circular reliance on causal laws, as the proper ‘algorithm’ for identifying all 
three forms of involvement. ibid 433–37, 441–44, 446, 452–53 and fn 45, 472–74, 479–80; text to n 125 above.
142 Wright (n 13) 297–98; Wright (n 3) 1035–37. Stapleton ignores these sources when she asserts that ‘Wright 
does not adequately address . . . whether it is coherent, acceptable, convenient or wise notionally to disaggregate an 
individual person’s decision’. Stapleton (n 1) 476.
143 Hart and Honoré (n 5) xxxvii, 2, 22–23, 55–61; Honoré (n 1) 363, 382, 384; Honoré (n 10) 7-53, 7-168.
144 See text to nn 35–39 above.
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The second point also is true, but it is true only because all the relevant conditions are 
not the same. As Honoré notes, even for the same person, there is the additional informa-
tion provided by the similar past experience.145 There also is the additional information 
provided by other intermediate experiences, other sources of new knowledge, and possibly 
different decision criteria due to, eg, changed goals and attitudes towards risk. Two differ-
ent persons have different experiences, genetic makeup and goals.
Honoré agrees that attributions of reasons for decisions or actions involve a belief 
that the (known and unknown) reasons in the aggregate were sufficient (along with other 
relevant conditions) for the decision or action, although none of them may have been 
strongly necessary or independently strongly sufficient. He treats such reasons as ‘necessary 
elements in a set of reasons together sufficient’ for the relevant decision,146 and he cites with 
apparent approval my application of the NESS account to such reasons.147 However, he 
claims that the sense of sufficiency is different than for physical sequences.148 The difference 
he seems to have in mind is the alleged lack of repeatability in the same circumstances, but 
this is contrary to the assumed sufficiency of the set of conditions, including reasons, on 
the particular occasion. As I have previously noted, if all the relevant conditions were jointly 
sufficient in the first instance, they will also be jointly sufficient in subsequent instances 
involving the same set of relevant conditions:149
[I]f all the relevant conditions (accumulated experience and knowledge, beliefs, goals, mood, and 
so forth) were the same, surely the decision or action would also be the same. To assert otherwise 
is to assert that human action is random or arbitrary. Human action is less regular and predictable 
than physical events because humans learn from prior experiences and new information, the range 
of relevant conditions is much broader, and the applicable causal generalizations are much more 
complex and less well understood.150
The fact that the applicable causal generalisations and the underlying causal laws for 
human decisions are much more complex and less well understood than those for physical 
events often makes it especially difficult to determine what decision a person would have 
made if she had been provided with some information or opportunity that was not pro-
vided. In a recent essay, I erroneously stated that we need to have this question answered, 
and thus must use (highly restricted) counterfactual analysis, to resolve the causal issue in 
situations in which the defendant tortiously failed to provide some safeguard (information 
or device), which if provided and used would have prevented the injury that occurred.151 
The causal issue in such situations involving the failure of a preventive causal process 
instead should be resolved, without any counterfactual analysis, by using the method of 
analysis that is discussed in sections III.H and III.I below.
As is discussed in section III.I, the lack of an attempt to access and use a safeguard pre-
empts the potential failure of the preventive causal process (involving the successful use of 
145 Honoré (n 1) 382.
146 ibid 383.
147 ibid 377 fn 40 (citing Wright (n 3) 1035–37).
148 ibid 383–85; see Honoré (n 10) 7-121.
149 Although Mackie argues for strong necessity rather than strong sufficiency when identifying singular 
instances of causation, see text to nn 19–22 above and nn 156–58 below, he agrees that there is a single basic con-
cept of natural causation that applies equally to physical events and human decisions and actions. Mackie (n 9) 
122–26.
150 Wright (n 13) 298.
151 ibid 301–02; see V Black, ‘Decision Causation: Pandora’s Tool-Box’ in J Neyers, E Chamberlain and SGA Pitel 
(eds), Emerging Issues in Tort Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007) 309.
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the safeguard) at the subsequent stage in that process, never reached, in which the attempt 
would have failed due to the non-provision of the safeguard. However, the non-provision 
of the safeguard nevertheless was a cause of the non-prevented injury if (unlike the braking 
situation discussed in section III.I) the lack of an attempt to use the safeguard was caused 
by its non-provision – for example, by knowledge of its non-provision or, conversely, by 
lack of knowledge of its possible availability due to its non-provision.
As in other overdetermined causation situations, the causal issue in these non- provided-
safeguard situations unfortunately is often confused with the ‘no worse off ’ limitation on 
attributable responsibility, which generally treats the defendant as not being legally respon-
sible for an injury, despite having tortiously contributed to its occurrence, if the injury 
would have happened anyway due to non-liability-generating conditions – for example, if 
a plaintiff (who cannot sue himself) would not have used the information or safeguard 
even if it had been provided.152 To resolve this attributable responsibility issue in these and 
other pre-emptive causation situations, (highly restricted) counterfactual analysis will be 
required.
Treating human decisions, like other biologically based mental processes, as subject to 
causal laws is not incompatible with a plausible conception of free will, given the very com-
plex, goal-directed nature of human decision-making. Indeed, to treat human decisions as 
not being subject to causal laws would imply that they are arbitrary and irrational, rather 
than free in the sense of being based on one’s interests and goals. On the other hand, as I 
will explain in the next section, the presence of a random or probabilistic element in human 
decision-making would not undermine the concept of causation or make it impossible to 
provide causal explanations of human decisions and actions.
G. Indeterminism and ‘Probabilistic Causation’153
In a radically indeterministic world, in which nothing was (weakly or strongly) necessary or 
sufficient for anything else, the concepts of causation and probability likely would not exist 
due to lack of instantiation. Our world is at most only partially indeterministic – that is, 
probabilistic. A great many apparently probabilistic processes appear to be so only because 
we have insufficient knowledge of the underlying causal laws and turn out on closer exami-
nation to be deterministic.154 As far as we know all apparently indeterministic processes may 
be deterministic. As Mackie stated, the difficulty one encounters in trying to describe truly 
indeterministic statistical ‘laws of working’ reinforces doubt about their existence. Such a law 
would seem to require an objective chance or propensity inherent in each individual occur-
rence of the antecedent conditions, but one can deny the existence of such objective entities 
with arguments similar to those used to deny the existence of objective causal qualities or 
powers in deterministic processes. Mackie concluded that the only workable formulation 
would be a limiting frequency on actual outcomes of a series of instances of a certain set of 
antecedent conditions. Yet, he noted, this formulation deprives such statistical laws of 
explanatory power. There is no apparent way to explain, without invoking deterministic 
152 See Wright, Legal Responsibility (n 9) 1434–78.
153 Portions of this section are taken, with minor modifications, from Wright (n 3) 1028–31.
154 See Mackie (n 9) 49–50, 76, 237–38, 242–46.
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laws, why an actual series does or should approach a limiting frequency. Truly indeterminis-
tic or probabilistic laws, therefore, are unintelligible and mysterious.155
However, Mackie and others have used the theoretical possibility of partially indeter-
ministic processes to argue against the universal applicability of a strong-sufficiency 
account of causation and, indeed, for the preferability of the sine qua non account. Mackie 
postulates a candy machine L that never produces candy unless a shilling is inserted, but 
sometimes, due to indeterminism, does not produce candy even when a shilling is inserted. 
He assumes that this means that the insertion of a shilling in machine L is strongly 
necessary but not strongly sufficient for the machine’s production of candy, and that, 
since whenever candy is produced we will treat the strongly necessary condition of the 
insertion of the shilling as a cause, strong sufficiency is not necessary for causation, but 
strong necessity is.156
Fumerton and Kress make the same argument using a similar example: a bomb activated 
by the indeterministic decay of a radioactive element, which has a very low probability of 
going off during the intended victim’s lifetime but which nevertheless does go off a few 
minutes after being planted and kills the intended victim. However, countering Mackie, 
they note that even the sine qua non account will not properly identify the decay-activated 
bomb as a cause if there was a backup deterministically activated bomb.157
Mackie, Fumerton and Kress incorrectly assume that there is a lack of strong sufficiency 
in these examples. They seem to assume that the planting of the bomb or the insertion of 
the shilling must be sufficient all by itself – a situation that is rarely if ever true. The plant-
ing of the bomb or the insertion of the shilling need only be one of the conditions that are 
each necessary for the sufficiency of the set of conditions that constitutes the antecedent of 
the relevant causal law. Another of those conditions in each example is the occurrence of 
the specified indeterministic state or event: the decay of the radioactive element in the 
bomb or the unknown indeterministic state or event in the candy machine, respectively. 
When the bomb explodes or the machine produces candy, the planting of the bomb or the 
insertion of the shilling, respectively, was both strongly necessary and strongly sufficient for 
the occurrence of that result, as was the occurrence of the relevant indeterministic state or 
event.
Mackie’s other candy machine hypothetical demonstrates, contrary to what he intended, 
that causation requires causal (rather than merely lawful) strong sufficiency rather than 
strong necessity. This machine, M, always produces candy when a shilling is inserted, but 
occasionally, as a result of some mysterious indeterministic process, produces candy even 
though no shilling was inserted. Mackie assumes that the insertion of a shilling in machine 
M is strongly sufficient but not strongly necessary for the production of candy. He asserts 
155 Mackie (n 9) 239–47; see Wright (n 3) 1029, 1042–49. Some believe that the notion of deterministic causa-
tion collapsed with the announcement in 1927 of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. That principle, even if valid, 
merely states that it is impossible to measure simultaneously the position and velocity of an object so that the 
product of the uncertainties in measurement is less than an infinitesimally small constant – about 10 to the minus 
34th power joule-seconds. 10 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Micropaedia,15th edn (1979) 253. While this might cause 
problems in hypothetical lawsuits between subatomic particles, it creates no problems at the macroscopic level of 
events in everyday life. Others believe that the notion of causation collapsed with the introduction of functional 
equations in science. Yet functional relationships in science are merely mathematically quantified statements of 
causal laws or generalisations, which usually are expressed through time-based derivatives of the regularities 
of succession that constitute ordinary causal generalisations. Mackie (n 9) 143–48, 153–54, 216–18. The concept 
of causation is alive and well in the natural and social sciences.
156 Mackie (n 9) 41–43.
157 Fumerton and Kress (n 1) 97–98.
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that when candy is produced by machine M following the insertion of a shilling, we will 
be unable to say whether the production of the candy by machine M was caused by the 
insertion of the shilling or by the indeterministic process. He concludes that strong suffi-
ciency is not sufficient to establish causation; rather, strong necessity is required.158
Yet, when candy is produced after a shilling is inserted in machine M, we know by 
definition that the insertion of the shilling produced the candy through the deterministic 
process, if the insertion of a shilling is causally strongly sufficient for the production of 
candy. What we do not know is whether the probabilistic event and its associated indeter-
ministic process also occurred, since we have no knowledge of and cannot directly observe 
the probabilistic event or its associated indeterministic process. If the probabilistic event 
did not occur, the candy was produced solely by the deterministic process. If the probabil-
istic event did occur, then either the candy was duplicatively produced by both the deter-
ministic and the indeterministic processes (if the probabilistic event also was causally 
strongly sufficient) or else the candy was produced solely by the deterministic process, 
which pre-empted the indeterministic process. Thus, no matter what happened with the 
indeterministic process, the insertion of the shilling was a (duplicative or pre-emptive) 
cause of the production of the candy.
This conclusion is logically compelled by the definition of causal strong sufficiency, if the 
insertion of a shilling is causally strongly sufficient for the production of candy in machine 
M. If that assumption is removed, so that we only have the empirical observation that 
machine M produces candy whenever a shilling is inserted, but sometimes produces candy 
although nothing was inserted, then Mackie is right when he insists that we cannot say on 
any particular occasion that the insertion of the shilling was a cause of the production of 
the candy. In the absence of the causal strong sufficiency assumption, it is possible that the 
deterministic process initiated by the insertion of the shilling was pre-empted by the inde-
terministic process. But this reinforces the argument that causation requires causal strong 
sufficiency. When we assumed that causal strong sufficiency existed, we were compelled to 
conclude that the insertion of the shilling caused the production of the candy. When we 
dropped the causal strong sufficiency assumption, we no longer could identify the cause(s) 
of the candy’s production.
In sum, Mackie’s indeterministic machine hypotheticals, and others like them,159 
demonstrate the reverse of what he claims. They demonstrate that attributions of causa-
tion, even in a partially indeterministic world, depend on the causal strong sufficiency 
requirement embodied in the NESS account rather than the strong necessity requirement 
embodied in the sine qua non account.
H. Omissions and Negative Causation
We routinely identify omissions, such as the failure to water a plant or to pay attention 
while driving, as causes of some result, such as the death of the plant or a traffic accident, 
respectively. However, there is reason to question whether omissions or other negative con-
ditions can actually be causes or effects. As John Stuart Mill, who provided the philosophi-
cal foundation of the NESS account, observed, ‘From nothing, from a mere negation, no 
158 Mackie (n 9) 41–43.
159 See eg, Collins, Hall and Paul, Introduction (n 9) 26–27. Their examples nicely illustrate the defectiveness of 
attempts to define causation in terms of increased probability. See also Wright (n 3) 1042–49.
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consequences can proceed’.160 Mill nevertheless saw the need to include negative conditions 
as causal (NESS) conditions:
We say for example, The army was surprised because the sentinel was off his post. But since the 
sentinel’s absence was not what created the enemy or put the soldiers asleep, how did it cause them 
to be surprised? All that is really meant is, that event would not have happened if he had been at his 
duty. His being off his post was no producing cause, but the mere absence of a preventing cause: it 
was simply equivalent to his non-existence. From nothing, from a mere negation, no consequences 
can proceed. All effects are connected, by the law of causation, with some set of positive conditions; 
negative ones, it is true, being almost always required in addition. In other words, every fact or 
phenomenon which has a beginning invariably arises when some certain combination of positive 
facts exists, provided certain other positive facts do not exist. . . .
The cause, then, philosophically speaking, is the sum total of the conditions positive and nega-
tive taken together; the whole of the contingencies of every description, which being realised, the 
consequent invariably follows. The negative conditions, however, of any phenomenon, a special 
enumeration of which would generally be very prolix, may be all summed up under one head, 
namely, the absence of preventing or countervailing causes.161
In this passage, Mill draws two important distinctions, without clearly distinguishing 
them or clarifying the precise nature of the second distinction. The first distinction is 
between ‘positive’ conditions and ‘negative’ conditions; the second distinction is between a 
‘producing’ or ‘positive’ cause and a ‘non-producing’ or ‘negative’ cause. There seems to be 
general agreement on the first distinction: a ‘positive’ condition is the presence of some act, 
event or entity in a particular situation; a ‘negative’ condition is the absence of some act, 
event or entity in a particular situation. There is less agreement on the existence and nature 
of the second distinction.162 I consider the distinction to be as follows: a ‘producing’ or 
‘positive’ cause is a NESS condition that is connected to the consequence at issue by a causal 
process in which each step in the process has a positive condition as its consequence; a 
‘negative’ cause is a NESS condition that is connected to the consequence at issue by a 
causal process in which at least one of the steps in the process has a negative condition as its 
consequence.
Many philosophers believe that a negative condition cannot be a positive cause, but 
rather, at best, can only be a negative cause.163 Some argue that negative conditions cannot 
be part of any plausible account of reality and thus cannot be any sort of cause. Moore is 
most insistent on this point. He notes, correctly, that there are no negative conditions in the 
sense of the negative opposite of a positive condition, for example non-tramplings by non-
elephants. Rather, a negative condition must be understood to be the absence of some pos-
itive condition, rather than the ‘ghostly’ reality of its negative opposite.164 Moore and others 
160 Mill (n 5) bk III ch V s 3.
161 ibid.
162 Jonathan Schaffer describes ‘positive’ causation as a ‘physical connection’ through transmission of some 
physical entity, structure or ‘mark’ between a cause and the consequence, without the involvement of any negative 
conditions, and ‘negative causation’ as counterfactual dependency of the consequence on the cause in the absence 
of any such physical connection. J Schaffer, ‘Causes need not be Physically Connected to their Effects: The Case for 
Negative Causation’ in Christopher Hitchcock (ed), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science (Oxford, 
Blackwell, 2004) 197, 203–04, 214. Ned Hall makes a similar distinction between ‘production’ and ‘dependence’ as 
two different concepts or kinds of causation. His concept of ‘production’ focuses on the spatio-temporal contigu-
ity and ‘intrinsicness’ (internal structure) of the causal process rather than physical transmission of some entity. 
Hall (n 14) 225–27, 253–54.
163 eg Hall (n 14) 253, 260; Schaffer 162) 197–98; Thomson (n 1) 163 fn 12.
164 eg Moore (n 1) 53–55, 399–400, 444–45, 460–61.
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agree that propositions about the absence of some positive condition can be included as 
NESS conditions in laws. However, Moore notes, again correctly, that such propositions, 
being mere abstractions rather than aspects of reality, cannot be concrete instantiations of 
the abstract conditions in causal laws and thus cannot enter into causal relations as causes 
or effects.165
What Moore refuses to acknowledge is that the absence of some positive condition is an 
aspect of reality, a fact that makes the relevant proposition true or false, 166 that is as much a 
part of the real, existing state of affairs on a particular occasion as are the positive conditions 
in existence on that occasion.167 Indeed, negative conditions often are positive or producing 
causes rather than negative causes, through the perception of the negative condition by 
a sentient being. For example, the absence of a salute by a soldier is a positive cause of an 
officer’s perception of that absence and the consequent disciplining of the soldier, a baseball 
player’s failure to touch a base is a positive cause of an umpire’s perception of that failure and 
the consequent ruling that the player is out, the absence of a stop sign or signal is a positive 
cause of a motorist’s perception of that absence and the motorist’s consequent proceeding 
through the intersection with his foot pushing down on the accelerator, and the absence of a 
poison label on a container is a positive cause of a consumer’s perception of that absence and 
con sequent drinking, ingestion or handling of the contents of the container.168
Negative conditions also can be and often are effects. Indeed, a refusal to recognise nega-
tive conditions as effects makes it impossible to account for what is probably the most 
paradigmatic instance of an effect, to which Moore repeatedly adverts: death. Although 
Moore argues otherwise,169 death as an event is a transition between a positive condition, 
165 ibid 303–04, 347–48, 351–53, 445, 461, 479. David Lewis agrees, but nevertheless treats absences as causes:
Absences are bogus entities. Yet the proposition that an absence occurs is not bogus. . . . And it is by way of just 
such propositions, and only by way of such propositions, that absences enter into patterns of counterfactual 
dependence. . . . Should we conclude, then, that when we say absences are causes, really it is true negative 
propositions that do the causing? – No; in other cases, we distinguish between the cause itself and the true 
proposition that describes it. . . . [T]he proposition is a necessary being, ‘abstract’ in one sense of that multifari-
ously ambiguous term, and doesn’t cause anything. . . . I refuse to concede that facts – true propositions – are 
literally causes. So I have to say that when an absence is a cause or an effect, there is strictly speaking nothing at 
all that is a cause or effect. Sometimes causation is not a relation, because a relation needs relata and sometimes 
the causal relata go missing.
Lewis (n 53) 100.
166 I use ‘fact’ in the sense of a part of reality, a concrete property of a state of affairs, what Moore refers to as 
‘facta’ to avoid confusing this sense with the different sense (that eg Ned Hall and David Lewis have in mind) of a 
true proposition about reality. See Hall (n 14) 254; Lewis (n 53) 100; Moore (n 1) 333, 341–47. It is not clear to me 
which sense Judith Thomson has in mind. See Thomson (n 1) 148, 150.
167 Moore (n 1) 352. At one point (only), to preserve his criticism of the NESS account’s recognition of omis-
sions as causes, Moore acknowledges that abstract negative conditions can be instantiated:
When [NESS and other strong-sufficiency theorists] are asking after the truth makers for the negative condi-
tions in laws, they are not looking for negative tokens of negative types. Rather, the truth-maker for negative 
conditions is the absence of any positive instances of some type. The law is “instantiated” in this sense whenever 
its negative conditions are made true by the world. In that sense, negative conditions can be ‘instantiated’, and 
so omissions will be causes.
ibid 479.
168 Wright (n 13) 291; cf Collins, Hall and Paul, Introduction (n 9) 48 (‘Billy’s failure to show up for their lunch 
date causes Suzy to become disappointed’); Schaffer (n 162) 201 (‘One can perceive black holes or any other black 
entity, which is merely an absence of radiated light energy’). The same cognitive processes, which are limited 
and often biased, are involved in the perception of positive as well as negative conditions. A good example is the 
well-known optical illusion in which one sees either an old hag or a young, beautiful woman when looking at the 
drawing or picture of the woman, but never both at the same time.
169 eg Moore (n 1) 442 (‘Dying is also a presence, even if it can be described as “not surviving”, and surviving is 
an absence, even if it sounds like it is referring to some actual state of affairs’); see ibid 53–55, 303.
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being alive (with a functioning heart or brain, depending on one’s preferred definition) 
to a negative condition, the absence of life – which, unfortunately, for each of us is an 
ultimately certain real state of affairs. The relevant positive causal processes for the main-
tenance of life, at least as we know it, include as necessary positive conditions the presence 
of sufficient amounts of water, oxygen (for humans and other complex animals) and 
certain nutrients. The negative condition of an absence of the required amount of water, 
oxygen or nutrients, or of the blood that transports oxygen and nutrients to the brain and 
other parts of the body, is a negative cause of the negative condition of death (the absence 
of life).
As Jonathan Schaffer demonstrates, to deny that negative conditions participate in cau-
sation (generally but not always as negative causes or effects) is to blind oneself to the layers 
of the causal web and, more significantly, to deny that humans ever cause anything:
The pattern of negative causation features in even the most paradigmatically causal cases. Suppose 
that the sniper feels murderous, pulls the trigger, fires a bullet through the victim’s heart, and the 
victim dies. Here is a paradigmatic causal sequence, every step of which is negative causation.
Working backwards, surely the firing of the bullet through the victim’s heart causes the victim to 
die. But heart damage only causes death by negative causation: heart damage (c) causes an absence 
of oxygenated blood flow to the brain (~d), which causes the cells to starve (e) [and die]. . . .
At the next step backwards, surely the pulling of the trigger causes the bullet to fire. But 
trigger pullings only cause bullet firings by negative causation: pulling the trigger (c) causes the 
removal of the sear from the spring (~d), which causes the spring to uncoil, thereby compressing 
the gunpowder and causing an explosion, which causes the bullet to fire (e). . . .
At the third and final step backwards, surely the sniper’s feeling murderous causes him to pull 
the trigger. But nerve signals only cause muscle contractions (such as that of the sniper’s trigger 
finger) by negative causation: the firing of the nerve (c) causes a calcium cascade through themus-
cle fiber, which causes calcium-troponin binding, which causes the removal of [the inibitor] tro-
pomyosin from the binding sites on the actin (~d), which causes myocin-actin binding, and 
thereby causes the actin to be pulled in and the muscle to contract (e). . . .
Since all voluntary human actions are due to muscle contractions, it therefore follows that 
all voluntary human actions (perhaps the most paradigmatic of all causes) involve negative 
causation.170
As Schaffer’s example illustrates, acts and other positive conditions often are negative 
causes. Acts of shooting, stabbing, strangling, removal of water or food, etc cause the nega-
tive condition of the absence of life by causing the negative condition of the absence of one 
or more of the necessary conditions (water, oxygen, nutrients, blood etc) for the positive 
causal process of maintaining life. Acts as well as omissions also cause positive conditions 
through negative causation, by preventing a positive causal process that would have pre-
vented the occurrence of the positive condition. For example, the act of removing a safety 
device or damaging it so that it no longer works results in the same negative state of affairs 
170 Schaffer (n 162) 199–200; see ibid 202 (‘Biologists routinely invoke negative causation, such as in explaining 
diseases. What causes scurvy is an absence of vitamin D, what causes diabetes milletus is an absence of insulin, and 
what causes dwarfism is an absence of growth hormone, and so on. The way in which HIV causes death is by dis-
connecting the immune system’). Schaffer notes that ‘negative causation is supported by all the central conceptual 
connotations of causation, including counterfactual, statistical, agential, evidential, explanatory, and moral con-
notations’. ibid 202; see ibid 198–203; D Fair, ‘Causation and the flow of energy’ (1979) 14 Erkenntnis 219, 248 
(noting that a shadow is an absence of light and that ‘ice on the road caused the auto accident because the road 
failed to transmit its usual frictional force to the tires’).
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– the lack of a working safety device, which if present and working would have prevented 
some injury – that exists if there is no working safety device in the first place. The act of 
removing the top X feet from a dam results in the same negative state of affairs – the lack of 
adequate height of the dam, which if present would have prevented a flood – that exists if 
the dam initially lacked those X feet of height.171
Thus, the critical distinction for purposes of causal analysis is not the distinction between 
positive conditions (eg, acts) and negative conditions (eg, omissions), but rather between 
positive causation and negative causation. This distinction is critical because the analysis of 
each type of causation, although based on the same underlying (NESS) account of causa-
tion, differs owing to their differing focus. A negative condition, eg, being dead, is the 
absence of a positive condition, eg, being alive. Such absences exist owing to the lack of 
occurrence of the positive causal process(es) that would have produced the relevant posi-
tive conditions. Thus, while the analysis of positive causation focuses on the successful 
completion of the relevant positive causal process(es), the analysis of negative causation 
focuses on the failure of a positive causal process. To know that a positive causal process 
succeeded, we need to know that all of the necessary conditions in the antecedents of the 
relevant causal generalisations and their underlying causal laws were instantiated on the 
particular occasion. To know how one or more of them was instantiated, we need to go one 
or more levels deeper in the causal web. To know that a positive causal process failed, we 
need know that at least one of the necessary conditions in the antecedents of the relevant 
causal generalisations and their underlying causal laws was not instantiated. To know what 
caused its failure we need to know at what point it failed and go one or more levels deeper 
in the causal web to find out why it failed at that point.
As Mill noted, for any particular positive causal process, there are a multitude of possible 
preventing causes that could prevent its successful completion by preventing the instantia-
tion of one of its necessary antecedent conditions. Mill’s omnibus negative condition – the 
absence of any preventing cause – encompasses all the different possibilities, a listing of 
which is practically impossible.172 If all the necessary conditions (which may include nega-
tive conditions)173 for the positive causal process were fully specified, there perhaps would 
be no need to engage in any analysis of negative causation, since the instantiation of all of 
the fully specified necessary conditions would be inconsistent with the existence of any 
preventing cause. However, such a complete listing of all the necessary conditions is rarely 
if ever possible in practice. Mill’s omnibus negative condition – the absence of any prevent-
ing cause – partially fills the gap, while also serving the useful purpose of emphasising the 
importance of always considering the possible existence of preventing causes.
171 Wright (n 13) 291–92. Negative causation by acts or other positive conditions is often referred to as ‘preven-
tion’ – simple ‘prevention’ when the consequence is a negative condition and ‘double prevention’ when the conse-
quence is a positive condition that occurred because the act prevented the occurrence of a causal process that, if 
not prevented, would have prevented the occurrence of the consequence. See Hall (n 14) 241; Moore (n 1) 54, 62, 
130–31, 303, 459–61.
172 See text to n 161 above. Moore properly criticises me for some ‘incautious’ references to this omnibus nega-
tive condition when engaging in some specific causal analyses, while generously granting that I do not place much 
reliance on it. Moore (n 1) 492, 494. In each of the cited analyses, I relied instead on non-instantiation of a specific 
necessary condition in the positive causal process. See Wright (n 5) 1795; Wright, Once More (n 14) 1129–30; text 
to nn 88, 95–96 above.
173 See text to n 168 above.
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I. Overdetermined Negative Causation
Philosophers, including those who reject counterfactual dependency analyses of positive 
causation, generally believe that counterfactual dependency analysis is required for 
situations involving negative causation.174 Yet, as with overdetermined positive causation, 
counterfactual dependency (sine qua non, ‘but for’, ‘made a difference’) analysis will not 
properly resolve situations involving overdetermined negative causation.
Philosophers have discussed a ‘pre-emptive pre-emption’ example in which a ball is 
thrown towards a window, is caught by B before it reaches the window and breaks it, but 
would have been caught by C, who was standing behind B with her arm raised to catch the 
ball, if B had not caught it. Neither B’s nor C’s conduct is a necessary condition for (‘made 
a difference’ with respect to) the window’s not being broken, since the conduct of the other 
person guaranteed the ball’s being stopped before it reached and broke the window. 
Nevertheless, when people are asked who prevented the ball’s reaching and breaking the 
window, they almost always say B did. However, if C is replaced by a brick wall that would 
have stopped the ball if B had not caught it, many people’s first reaction is that B did not 
prevent the ball’s reaching the window, presumably because the fact that it would never 
have reached the window anyway is much more obvious although no more certain than in 
the original hypothetical. Yet, if they are then asked to identify who or what did prevent the 
ball’s reaching the window, people again usually choose B. The options ‘neither B nor the 
wall’ and ‘both B and the wall’ are quickly ruled out, and choosing the wall is implausible 
given that the ball never reached the wall. This leaves B as the only plausible answer.175
B is also the correct answer in both versions of the example. As in the similar examples of 
pre-emptive overdetermined positive causation, eg, the destruction by fire A of a house that 
would have been destroyed anyway by the subsequent arrival of fire B, refusing to treat B’s 
catching the ball as the cause of the ball’s not reaching the window or, worse, choosing C or 
the wall as a pre-emptive or duplicative cause, confuses strong necessity or lawful strong 
sufficiency (guaranteeing an outcome), respectively, with causal strong sufficiency (actually 
causing the outcome). Although C’s backstopping B or the presence of the wall guaranteed 
that the ball would stop its forward motion before it reached the window, and thus pre-
vented B’s catching the ball from ‘making a difference’ in the ball’s not reaching the win-
dow, neither condition was guaranteed to be the actual cause of the ball’s stopping, and 
neither condition actually stopped the ball. Instead, B’s catching the ball stopped it. C or the 
wall would have stopped the ball, but only at a later and further point, which the ball did 
174 eg Hall (n 14) 248–53; Lewis (n 45) 281–85; Schaffer (n 162) 197, 214. Schaffer assumes this even though, 
when criticising Phil Dowe, he makes use of the fact that the counterfactual-dependency analysis cannot properly 
resolve situations involving overdetermined negative causation. Schaffer (n 162) 212–13. Surprisingly, Schaffer 
ignores overdetermined positive as well as negative causation when he states that even positive causation requires 
counterfactual dependency. ibid 214. David Armstrong follows Dowe in using counterfactual dependency to pro-
vide an account of negative causes and effects as ‘parasitic’ on positive causation, without however accepting 
counterfactual dependency as an analysis of causation. DM Armstrong, ‘Going through the Open Door Again: 
Counterfactual versus Singularist Theories of Causation’ in Collins, Hall and Paul (n 9) 445, 447–49. Even Moore, 
despite all of his criticisms of counterfactual dependency analysis, uses it as a ‘non-causal’ basis for attributing 
moral and legal responsibility to what I and others call negative causes. Moore (n 1) 144, 302–05, 353, 451–53, 
458–60.
175 M McDermott, ‘Redundant Causation’ (1995) 43 British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 523, 525; see 
Collins (n 69) 107; Lewis (n 53) 102–03; T Maudlin, ‘Causation, Counterfactuals, and the Third Factor’ in Collins, 
Hall and Paul (n 9) 419, 435–38.
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not reach, in the ball’s movement towards the window. All of this is true even if the wall or 
C was in place, guaranteeing the ball’s failure to reach the window, prior to B’s arrival on 
the scene.176
This example illustrates the critical difference in the proper method of analysing positive 
causation and negative causation when there is causal overdetermination. In situations 
involving positive causation, we need to determine whether each possibly applicable posi-
tive causal process was fully instantiated. Only those that were fully instantiated in each 
step of the process were causes; the rest were pre-empted. Since the focus is on complete 
instantiation of every step in the process, not much attention needs to be paid to the 
sequencing of the steps. However, when analysing overdetermined negative causation, it is 
critically important to focus on the sequencing of the steps in the positive causal process 
that failed, in order to determine at which step it failed. As courts generally correctly hold, 
the failure at that step pre-empted any potential failure at subsequent steps, the occurrence 
of which is dependent on successful completion of all the prior steps.177 In the thrown ball 
example, the positive causal process that failed requires, among other necessary conditions, 
the ball’s continuing to move at each point along its line of travel in the direction of the 
window with sufficient speed to reach the window. The failure of the ball to continue along 
this line at the point where B caught the ball pre-empted its potential failure at the subse-
quent point along the line where C or the wall was located, which it never reached.178
One of the most discussed examples of overdetermined negative causation in the legal 
literature is the Saunders case, in which a vehicular collision occurred when a motorist 
driving a rental car did not attempt to brake until it was too late to avoid the collision, but 
the brakes were defective owing to a lack of proper inspection and maintenance by the 
rental car company and therefore would not have stopped the car in time even if the driver 
had applied them earlier.179 Assume that there were two defects in the braking system: the 
lack of a bolt connecting the brake pedal to the lever rod between it and the master cylinder 
and the lack of sufficient hydraulic fluid in the master cylinder. There is considerable disa-
greement whether the defects in the brakes (for which the rental company’s lack of proper 
inspection and maintenance was a negative cause), the driver’s failure to attempt to use the 
brakes, neither, or both was a cause of the accident.
I have argued that the driver’s failure to attempt to use the brakes was a negative cause of 
the collision, which pre-empted the potential negative causal effect of the defects in the 
brakes. David Fischer rightly criticised my initial analysis for making conclusory statements 
without elaborating (or, admittedly, clearly seeing) the distinct methods of analysis required 
for negative causation (which involves the failure of a positive causal process) and positive 
176 See Wright (n 13) 298–300, 305; text to nn 84–96 above.
177 See Wright (n 13) 302–05; Wright, Once More (n 14) 1123–31; text at nn 152 and following n 171 above.
178 John Collins, confusing both guarantees and counterfactual dependency with causation, is ‘very reluctant’ to 
say that B’s catching the ball prevented the ball from breaking the window in the wall version of the hypothetical: 
‘Given that the wall was there, the window was never in any danger of being broken. The presence of the wall really 
does seem to make [B’s] catch irrelevant.’ Collins (n 69) 108. To persuade others of his position, Collins offers a 
third version of the hypothetical in which the Earth’s gravitational force replaces the wall and the window is 
replaced by a point one hundred million miles from the Earth. However, this third version is critically different. 
Unlike the first two versions, Collins is assuming that the ball lacked sufficient speed when it was released to reach 
the stated end point. The lack of sufficient speed when it was released caused the failure of the positive causal 
process of the ball’s reaching that very distant point the instant the ball was released and thus pre-empted the 
potential negative causal effect on that process of B’s subsequent catching of the ball.
179 Saunders System Birmingham Co v Adams 117 So 72 (Alabama, 1928).
318 Richard W Wright
causation (which involves the successful completion of a positive causal process).180 
Fischer’s criticism forced me to focus on and elaborate the distinction between these two 
types of causation and the distinct methods of analysis (both based on the NESS account) 
that are required for proper resolution of each, which I have restated above.181
The analysis of the failure of the braking-stops-car causal process is the same as in the 
thrown ball example. The braking process is a complex combination of a large number of 
more discrete causal processes, each of which is dependent for its occurrence on the occur-
rence of prior steps in the causal sequence. Some of the necessary events, in order of occur-
rence, are: (1) the driver’s applying force to depress the brake pedal; (2) the depression of 
the brake pedal operating a lever to put pressure on the hydraulic brake fluid in the master 
cylinder; (3) the pressure in the brake fluid being transmitted through pipes and tubes to 
the brake cylinders; (4) the pressure in the brake cylinders pushing braking pads against the 
rotating brake drum or disc in the wheel assembly; and (5) the friction created by such 
contact slowing and stopping the rotation of the wheels. Each of these steps in the braking 
process, which occur in sequence, is itself a causal process; each has its own set of necessary 
antecedent conditions, mostly related to the structure and integrity of the mechanical, 
hydraulic and electrical components of the various parts of the braking system.
The failure of any step in the braking process prevents that process from progressing any 
further in the sequence of dependent events. It thus pre-empts the potential negative causal 
effect of any non-instantiated conditions in subsequent steps, which would have caused the 
braking process to fail if it had progressed that far. In Saunders, when the very first step in 
the braking process, the driver’s depressing the brake pedal, does not occur, the braking 
process fails – actually never gets started – at that initial step in the causal sequence. The 
braking process does not get as far as step (2), although if it had got that far, it would then 
have failed owing to the missing bolt connecting the brake pedal to the lever, which in turn 
would have pre-empted the potential negative causal effect of the insufficient brake fluid in 
the master cylinder, which would have caused the braking process to fail at step (3) if it had 
progressed that far. But it never even got to step (1).
Duplicative as well as pre-emptive negative causation can occur. For example, if one 
mechanic put insufficient hydraulic brake fluid into the master cylinder for it to work and 
another failed to seal it properly so that whatever fluid was in it would leak out, their 
respective omissions, which negate required positive conditions for the occurrence of step 
(3) of the braking process, are duplicative negative causes of the failure of the braking sys-
tem to work, owing to the non-occurrence of step (3) in the braking process, when the 
brake pedal is subsequently depressed and there is no other defect.182
Fischer continues to assert that my detailed analysis of the situation in Saunders can be 
used to reach a conclusion opposite to the one that I reach: that the lack of proper inspec-
tion and maintenance of the brakes pre-empted the subsequent failure of the driver to 
attempt to use the brakes. He initially argues that this is true ‘because without good brakes 
an accident caused by a failure to stop became inevitable at the moment the car was given 
to the Driver’.183 This argument, like John Collins’ arguments regarding the thrown ball 
180 Fischer (n 118) 1357–59, criticising Wright (n 5) 1801.
181 Wright (n 13) 302–07; Wright, Once More (n 14) 1128–31; text to nn 177–78 above. Allan Beever’s criticism 
of my analysis of the Saunders situation fails to note my elaboration of the distinct nature of negative causation 
and the distinct method of analysis that is required when analysing overdetermined negative causation. See Beever 
(n 1) 423–25.
182 Wright (n 13) 305–07.
183 Fischer (n 1) 310 (emphasis added).
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hypothetical,184 once again confuses guaranteeing the occurrence of some consequence 
with actually causing that consequence.185
Fischer also argues that the existence of working brakes can be viewed as a step in the 
braking process that is prior to the driver’s pressing on the brake pedal, in which case, using 
the method of analysis that I claim is necessary for negative causation (failure of a positive 
causal process), the lack of working brakes due to the lack of proper inspection and main-
tenance caused the failure of the braking process and pre-empted the potential negative 
causal effect of the driver’s failure to timely use the brakes.186 Stapleton reiterates and 
expands on this argument. Without describing my analysis, she asserts:
The only indication of how Wright arrives at [his] conclusion is his assertion that we ‘must’ look at 
the sequence of the causal process that did not take place.
Two obvious objections to Wright’s analysis can be made. First, it is not at all clear why we ‘must’ 
look at this sequence. After all, in the actual world our two specified factors (the failure-to-repair 
and the failure-to-attempt-to-brake) did not occur in sequence; omissions simply do not ‘occur in 
sequence’; here both persisted at the time of the actual phenomenon of interest, namely the colli-
sion; so notions of one omission pre-empting another omission are, without more explanation, 
incoherent. Secondly, Wright merely stipulates that the relevant sequence would have started with 
‘the driver’s depressing the brake pedal.’ Yet we could just as easily have stipulated that the first step 
in the braking-stops-car causal process was the brake repair: after all, ‘delivery’ of the motorist’s 
foot on a workable brake pedal is not needed in the braking-stops-car causal process until the 
working brakes are in place.
Wright has no coherent rationale for choosing to stipulate the sequence in the way he does, and 
so, ironically, he stipulates the exact opposite sequence in a different example concerning the failure 
of a house-building project. Here he asserts that if there was a simultaneous failure to deliver 
concrete for the foundation and lumber for the framing of the house, the failure to deliver the 
concrete, which results in the failure of the house-building causal process at the foundation- 
building stage, preempts the potential negative causal effect of the failure to deliver the lumber, 
which is not needed until the subsequent framing stage, the occurrence of which depends on the 
prior occurrence of the foundation-building stage.187
Stapleton’s first objection puzzles me. As I have previously explained and have reiterated 
here, we must look at the physical sequencing of the braking process because we want to 
know how it failed, and determining that requires determining at what step in that process 
it failed. The failure at that step pre-empted the potential failure of the process at some later 
step that the process never reached. Stapleton erroneously states that the two relevant omis-
sions in Saunders did not occur in sequence. She seems to have in mind temporal sequence. 
If so, she is wrong: the failure properly to inspect and maintain the brakes occurred prior to 
the driver’s failure to timely attempt to apply the brakes. However, as I noted in my dis-
cussion of the thrown ball hypothetical, the temporal order of occurrence of the negative 
conditions at issue is not the sequence we need to consider.188 Instead, we need to consider 
the physical sequence of the steps in the braking process.
Fischer’s and Stapleton’s argument that we could and perhaps should view the braking 
process as starting with working brakes or their proper inspection and maintenance fails to 
pay attention to the structure of the relevant causal web. The defects in the braking system, 
184 See n 178 above.
185 See text to nn 84–96 and 176 above and following n 188 below.
186 Fischer (n 1) 310–11.
187 Stapleton (n 1) 478, quoting Wright, Once More (n 14) 306 (emphasis by Stapleton).
188 See text to n 176 above.
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for which the lack of proper inspection and maintenance was a negative cause, are like the 
wall in the thrown ball example. Although the existence of the defects in the braking system 
occurred prior to the driver’s failure to attempt to use the brakes and guaranteed the failure 
of the braking process, they did not actually cause the failure of the braking process. The 
defects in the brakes do not come into play in the braking process unless and until that 
process progresses to the steps, steps (2) and (3), at which those defects would actually 
cause the failure of the braking process. The braking process never reached those steps. 
Instead, it failed (never got started) owing to the driver’s failure to (timely) use the brakes. 
The occurrence of steps (2) and (3) in the braking process is dependent on successful com-
pletion of each prior step in that process, including step (1), the driver’s depression of the 
brake pedal. On the other hand, the occurrence of the driver’s depression of the brake pedal 
(step (1) in the braking process) is not dependent on the prior occurrence of steps (2) and 
(3) nor on the rental company’s prior proper inspection and maintenance of the brakes.
Stapleton’s third claim, that I inconsistently specify the sequencing of steps in different 
causal processes, apparently confuses my discussion of the dependency of occurrence of 
some steps in a causal process on the prior occurrence of other steps with claims regarding 
the strong necessity of various conditions. It is she, rather than I, who (unsuccessfully) 
attempts to use artificially constructed ‘duplicate necessity’189 rather than causal strong suf-
ficiency to identify causes. Perhaps her misinterpretation of my statements would have 
been avoided if I had employed ‘used’ rather than ‘needed; when noting the step in the 
house construction process in which the presence of lumber becomes causally relevant.
Fischer also asserts that my analyses of causation in these and other situations are faulty 
because they fail to conform with many persons’ intuitive ‘causal’ judgments, upon which 
he assumes I rely in all causally controversial situations.190 However, I have never stated that 
the analysis of causation should conform to persons’ intuitive ‘causal’ judgments in every 
case or even most cases. Indeed, I have often argued against taking persons’ intuitive ‘causal’ 
judgments as reliable judgments regarding true (natural) causation, since such judgments 
often include normative or purposive factors in addition to the causation issue.191 Instead, 
it is he and Stapleton who, while erroneously asserting that the NESS account privileges 
intuitive ‘causal’ judgments, continue to confuse intuitive judgments regarding liability 
with proper determinations of causation192 and unfortunately have led others into similar 
confusion.193 I have merely stated that, when attempting to determine the meaning of cau-
sation, including the proper senses of necessity and sufficiency, one should take into 
account our basic carefully considered intuitions regarding causation rather than policy 
189 See n 125 above.
190 Fischer (n 1) 299, 312–16.
191 See my articles cited in n 126 above.
192 See Wright, Once More (n 14) 1120–23 and fn 172; text to nn 92–94, 122–23, 127–35 above.
193 eg DF Partlett, ‘Foreword: David Fischer, the Fox’ (2008) 73 Missouri Law Review 281, 282–83, 286–87. 
Partlett and others have been led astray not only by Fischer’s confusion of causation with liability judgments, but 
also by his careless and misleading use of causal terminology, some of which unfortunately has been employed in 
the Restatement Third. See Wright, Legal Responsibility (n 9) 1449 and fn 81, 1464 and fn 146; Wright, Once More 
(n 14) 1126. Fischer’s misuse of causal terminology is particularly striking with his term, ‘dependently sufficient 
cause’, which he defines as an omission that ‘is insufficient to be a ‘but for’ cause of the result because the other 
omitted act was necessary for sufficiency’. Fischer (n 1) 279. This is a convoluted and highly misleading way of 
referring to a lack of strong necessity, which he misdescribes as a lack of ‘independent sufficiency’ and misapplies 
to situations like Saunders, in which each omission was not a ‘but for’ cause of but was ‘independently sufficient’ 
(in the lawful guarantee sense that Fischer assumes) for the failure of the braking process and the consequent col-
lision. See ibid 278–79. Stapleton uses without explanation a similarly unhelpful and misleading term, ‘dependent 
double omissions’, to refer to the omissions at issue in situations like Saunders. Stapleton (n 1) 477–78.
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considerations,194 while also insisting that a theoretical account of causation is necessary to 
back up these intuitions and to prevent them from leading us astray:
Despite the lack of an explicit comprehensive definition of causation, people from time immemo-
rial have shown remarkable agreement in their causal judgments, at least once they are clearly 
focused on the causal issue rather than on some noncausal inquiry regarding the (most significant 
for some purpose) cause. In particular, judges and juries, when not confined by incorrect tests or 
formulas, consistently have demonstrated an ability to make intuitively plausible factual causal 
determinations.
Some scholars rely heavily on this shared yet undefined concept of causation in their writings 
on causation and responsibility by grounding their arguments on intuitive responses to hypo-
thetical situations. Yet intuitions that are not conjoined with theory in a search for underlying 
principles are often inadequate for the hard cases and sometimes may mislead even in the easy 
cases. In these situations in particular we would benefit greatly from elaboration of the concept 
that, unarticulated and imperfectly understood, underlies the intuitive judgments.195
I continue to believe that the NESS account provides the needed comprehensively appli-
cable account of the concept of causation.
J. The Proliferation of Causes
As some critics have pointed out, the NESS account greatly increases the proliferation of 
causes.196 The NESS account, like the sine qua non account, recognises acts and omissions as 
causes through negative as well as positive causation, which dramatically increases the 
number of causes. Moreover, the NESS account goes beyond the sine qua non account by 
recognising as causes not only strongly necessary conditions, but also independently 
strongly sufficient conditions and conditions that were neither strongly necessary nor inde-
pendently strongly sufficient.
Even the sine qua non account is sometimes rejected by judges and others for treating as 
causes conditions that usually would not be identified as causes in ordinary speech but 
rather, if thought about at all, would be treated as ‘background conditions’ or as too remote 
in the causal web to even be acknowledged as background conditions. However, as I noted 
above,197 this merely reflects a confusion of the causal issue with contextual salience, which 
in the law is appropriately handled by focusing the causal analysis solely on legally relevant 
conditions and by applying normative attributable responsibility limitations on the scope 
or extent of liability for the consequences of those conditions. Depending on the circum-
stances and purpose of the particular causal enquiry, something not ordinarily treated in 
common speech as a cause would easily be described as such – eg, oxygen as a necessary 
condition for a fire in circumstances where oxygen was not expected to be present.198
As most critics of the NESS account acknowledge, the proliferation of causes is not a 
significant problem in analyses of legal responsibility.199 In law, as well as ordinary life, we 
194 Wright (n 3) 1020.
195 ibid 1018–19.
196 Collins, Hall and Paul, Introduction (n 9) 25; Fischer (n 1) 290–91; Fumerton and Kress (n 1) 98–99; Moore 
(n 1) 477–79, 486–95.
197 See text to nn 121–35 above.
198 See Hart and Honoré (n 5) 34–35; Wright (n 3) 1012–14.
199 Fischer (n 1) 289–90, 292; Fumerton and Kress (n 1) 87, 99; Stapleton (n 1) 440, 444, 448–51; Thomson 
(n 1) 150 fn 9; see Honoré (n 1) 367–69.
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are not interested in determining all of the practically innumerable immediate and remote 
causes of every event or state of affairs. In law, we are only interested in the possible causes 
of legally recognised injuries, and we are interested in only a very few of those possible 
causes: the aspect of the defendant’s conduct that made the defendant subject to potential 
liability, the negligent aspect (if any) of the plaintiff ’s conduct (which may result in 
application of the defence of contributory negligence), and highly unexpected intervening 
necessary conditions or independently lawfully sufficient non-responsible conditions 
(which generally will result in denials of legal responsibility – misleadingly described as 
‘proximate’ or ‘legal’ causation – despite tortious causation).200 Legal responsibility may 
also be denied for legally relevant conditions that made only a ‘trivial’ contribution to a 
legally recognised injury201 or that caused a legally recognised injury that was not the result 
of the actual or anticipated realisation of a risk that made the relevant party’s conduct 
wrongful.202 Moreover, failures to act to prevent a legally recognised injury generally are not 
considered to be wrongful (and thus legally relevant), or are considered wrongful only in 
very limited circumstances, if the person who failed to act had no responsibility for any 
positive condition in the positive causal process that produced the injury (eg, the no- or 
limited-duty rules for ‘nonfeasance’).
IV. concLusIon
While I do not claim to have addressed every possible objection to the NESS account, I have 
attempted to address all those of which I am aware. My consideration of the various objec-
tions has reinforced my belief that the NESS account is not merely a very useful tool for 
identifying singular instances of causation, which almost all of the critics of the NESS 
account admit, but that it does so precisely because it captures the essence of causation and 
gives it a comprehensive specification and meaning. I don’t think the former is possible in 
the absence of the latter.
200 Wright (n 5) 1741–44, 1759–74, 1798–1801; Wright, Legal Responsibility (n 9) 1434–78.
201 See text to n 123 above.
202 Wright, Legal Responsibility (n 9) 1479–1528.
